Child Welfare Case Compendium

Parents did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel during the adjudication of their infant as abused and neglected. Discusses reasonable strategy of parent attorneys not to present or object to evidence at the adjudicatory hearing.

Affirmed adjudication of infant as abused and neglected based on brief live testimony of the social worker where the social worker testified to the truthfulness and accuracy of the allegations in the petition and the court admitted the verified petition into evidence. Discusses court's permissible inference and findings that parents inflicted or allowed to be inflicted child's unexplained severe injuries.

Vacated and remanded PPOs eliminating reunification with Mother for two juveniles where the court failed to make written findings under G.S. 7B-906.2(b) and G.S. 7B-906.2(d)(3) and (4). Remanded PPO eliminating reunification with Mother for one child where the court made the ultimate written finding that reunification would be inconsistent with the child's health and safety but failed to make written findings regarding Mother's availability to the court, DSS, and the GAL required by G.S. 7B-906.2(d)(3).

Mother properly appealed PPOs that eliminate her reunification with the children as a permanent plan, though reunification with their fathers was not eliminated, under G.S. 7B-1001(a)(5).

Discusses Father's timely notice of appeal and non-jurisdictional defects in the notice. Father not entitled to seek relief from evidentiary ruling which Father invited. Father failed to preserve evidentiary issue for appellate review.

TPR affirmed on ground of dependency. Findings show that court considered more than Father's incarceration.

Vacated order dismissing A/N/D petition based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Though most findings were properly precluded by determinations made in prior orders entered before the petition was filed, the petition contained sufficient allegations to state a claim based on subsequent allegations and evidence. Discusses the doctrine of collateral estoppel under different standards of proof.

Affirmed subject matter jurisdiction to enter custody order under the UCCJEA. NC had modification jurisdiction. NY court declined exclusive, continuing jurisdiction and named NC the more appropriate forum, and NC was the child's home state.

Vacating and remanding civil no-contact order entered pursuant to the Workplace Violence Prevention Act for insufficient findings for the appellate court to determine whether respondent's conduct constituted unlawful conduct against DSS and its employees. Includes constitutional analysis of whether the order's restrictions violated respondent's right to free speech.

Vacated and remanded the adjudication of three children as neglected and the two older children as dependent due to insufficient findings. Findings were insufficient to support the adjudications, but the supreme court noted that the record includes evidence that could support the necessary findings and that the proper disposition is to remand to the trial court to enter a new order on the existing record or conduct further proceedings.

Affirmed adjudication of one year old as neglected based on Mother's failure to provide proper care, failure to provide or arrange necessary medical care for child's serious health conditions, and allowing the creation of an injurious environment. Discusses a parent’s mental health as a fixed and ongoing circumstance that is relevant in assessing the child’s environment and whether there is a substantial risk of harm to the child.

Reversed court of appeals and affirmed trial court's disposition order denying visitation for Mother and two of the three biological fathers. Discusses appellate review and standard of proof at disposition.

Affirmed adjudication of infant as a neglect juvenile; vacated the adjudication of the older sibling as a neglected juvenile due to insufficient findings. Discusses Fifth Amendment and marital privilege.

Affirmed trial court’s placement of children with their great aunt (an NC resident) prior to the completion of the ordered ICPC home study of their grandmother (an out-of-state resident). Holds that there is no statutory preference between different relatives, including out-of-state relatives; the ICPC applies to an order granting guardianship to out-of-state grandparents; and that trial court is not required to wait on a completed ICPC home study to rule out an out-of-state relative when it has determined an in-state relative can provide proper care and supervision in a safe home and the placement is in the best interest of the child.

The directive that Father have no contact with Mother was within the authority of the court under G.S. 7B-904(d1)(3) and was not an abuse of discretion. Father and Mother’s domestic violence was a condition that was found to have contributed to the child’s adjudication.

TPR reversed. Findings do not support ground of neglect to terminate Father's parental rights regarding children that have been in permanent guardianship for years.

Children's GAL adequately discharged their duties under G.S. 7B-601(a).

The court improperly delegated its judicial function in determining visitation conditions by ordering that the child’s visitation with Mother be at the discretion of the guardians.

Vacated and remanded PPO. The order was found to effectively waive future permanency planning hearings but did not satisfy the requirements of G.S. 7B-906.1(n) regarding required findings and standard of proof . The court of appeals did not review whether the ICWA standard of proof and findings were met.

No abuse of discretion in eliminating reunification with Grandmother as a permanent plan. Trial court did not impermissibly place the burden of proof of Grandmother regarding reasonable progress or err in considering the possibility of future neglect when determining the best interests of the children.

Mother's live-in female partner lacks standing to appeal the juvenile's adjudication and disposition orders under G.S. 7B-1001(a)(3) and G.S. 7B-1002 due to her status as a caretaker. Includes discussion of parentage and paternity under North Carolina statutes.

The supreme court reversed the court of appeals decision regarding the trial court’s adjudication of the child as neglected for reasons stated in the dissenting opinion, 289 N.C. App. 501 (2023). The dissent determined sufficient findings support the conclusion of neglect.

Mother argued transcript of TPR proceeding was inadequate. Mother failed to demonstrate that the narration of proceedings agreed upon by the parties and judicially noticed orders and reports were inaccurate or inadequate and precluded appellate review.

Affirmed NC court had modification jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to enter the adjudication and disposition order and subsequent permanency planning orders. Letter from NY court exercising continuous exclusive jurisdiction was sufficient to relinquish jurisdiction over the child custody determination and allow the NC court to obtain modification jurisdiction.

PWC granted. Mother and Father’s argument that the trial court erred has merit because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter neglect adjudication and disposition orders after dismissing the juvenile petitions with prejudice, and the parties showed extraordinary circumstances because of the substantial harm from separation of a family due to a void order and lack of finality in the juvenile case.

Allegations in petition were sufficient to put Father on notice of emotional abuse as a ground for the children's adjudication. Though DSS did not check the box on the initial or supplemental petitions, the petitions and attachments detailed facts supporting allegations of emotional abuse.

Affirmed TPR based on Mother's willfully leaving the children in foster care for more than 12 months and her failure to make reasonable progress to correct the conditions which led to their removal. Challenged findings based on judicially noticed findings from prior permanency planning orders were supported and corroborated by witness testimony, resulting in the court making an independent determination of the new evidence presented at the TPR hearing.

TPR affirmed. Challenged findings, except one disregarded finding, are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and support the conclusion that Mother failed to make reasonable progress that led to the child's removal. Includes discussion of Mother's limited ability to complete components of her case plan during periods of incarceration.

Affirmed TPR order concluding both Mother and Father's egregious conduct forfeited their right to counsel, including multiple counsel appointments and withdrawals, filing of invalid appeals, and filing of a civil action against their attorneys to prevent timely TPR proceedings.

North Carolina court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter custody order under UCCJEA.

Insufficient evidence that the proposed guardians jointly understood the legal significance and responsibilities of guardianship.

TPR affirmed. Challenged findings are supported by competent evidence and other unchallenged binding findings establish abandonment. Findings are sufficient and support conclusion of willful abandonment.

Father did not preserve the issue of the attorney's role as the child's GAL for appellate review.

No abuse of discretion in awarding guardianship to an in-state person without the benefit of the completed ICPC home study of another potential out-of-state placement. Order was based on children's best interests and supported by findings and conclusions. Evidence shows court received adequate evidence of the guardian's understanding of the legal significance of the placement. No error in closing matter, relieving DSS and GAL, but retaining jurisdiction.

This is an appeal of a private TPR, where father’s rights were terminated on the grounds of abandonment, neglect by abandonment, and neglect. The court of appeals affirmed the ground of abandonment and discussed the jurisprudence regarding the affirmation of one ground is sufficient to support a TPR order.

Reversed and remanded, ___ N.C. ___ (August 23, 2024). Findings do not support the conclusion of dependency of two older juveniles. There was no contrary evidence to mother’s testimony that she was willing and able to care for the two older juveniles and continue to parent the youngest juvenile. Supported findings regarding arguments between mother and one of the juveniles and the older juveniles' voluntary placement with relatives are insufficient to establish dependency.

Reversed and remanded, ___ N.C. ___ (August 23, 2024). Discussion of admission of child's statements under both the residual hearsay exception and statement of a party opponent exception to hearsay. Held admission was erroneous and prejudiced mother.

Insufficient findings to support neglect adjudication. REVERSED AND REMANDED, 385 N.C. 666 (2024) (per curiam).

Affirmed trial court's subject matter jurisdiction over the proceedings under the UCCJEA. Trial court properly exercised temporary emergency jurisdiction to enter initial, temporary nonsecure custody orders, and at the time of adjudication, NC had acquired home state jurisdiction, as Mother and children involved in the case had lived in the state for over six months and no other custody order existed in any other state with jurisdiction.

Mother waived defense of lack of personal jurisdiction when counsel appeared at TPR hearing and cross-examined witnesses. Mother failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel.

U.S Supreme Court held: (1) Congress has the power to enact ICWA; (2) ICWA does not violate the anticommandeering principle of the Tenth Amendment; and (3) No party has standing to raise the equal protection claim and the nondelegation challenge regarding the placement preferences.

No abuse of discretion in ceasing reunification efforts based on prior TPR. Vacate and remand no visitation order for failing to include findings about parent's constitutional rights and whether their forfeited their right to visit and if visits are not in the child's best interests.

Abuse of discretion for trial court to amend its TPR order pending appeal to specify that it applied clear, cogent, and convincing evidence standard.

TPR affirmed. Mother failed to make reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to the child's removal.

Findings do not support the conclusion that active efforts for reunification were provided to incarcerated father under ICWA.

TPR service and notice requirements were met. Mother's provisional counsel was released pursuant to G.S. 7B-1108.1.

Affirmed TPR based on grounds of failure to make reasonable progress. Court held referencing the DSS exhibit and finding the report credible and reliable is a proper evidentiary finding and sufficient to support the TPR grounds.

No abuse of discretion when court made findings of fact about all G.S. 7B-1110(a) factors, supported by competent evidence, and determined TPR was in the child's best interests.

No available caretaker for the juvenile for an indefinite period of time supports the conclusion of a substantial risk of harm. Findings support adjudication of neglect.

Found court of appeals' instruction to the trial court regarding visitation with the mother improper.

Service of TPR petition and summons was found proper. Summons met statutory requirements.

Sufficient findings to support TPR based on past neglect and likelihood of future neglect.

TPR affirmed on ground of dependency. Findings supporting father's incapability of providing proper care and supervision are supported by the evidence.

TPR affirmed on grounds of a prior involuntary TPR and father's inability or unwillingness to establish a safe home.

Pleading found sufficient to put father on notice of grounds for TPR.

Mother presented sufficient evidence of the existence of a child support order and father's willful failure to pay. Remand warranted.

Father satisfied all three statutory requirements mandating his consent to the child's adoption.

Trial court made sufficient findings to eliminate reunification and verify custodians' understanding of placement and adequacy of resources.

Sufficient findings to support adjudication of neglect and dependent juvenile, a medically fragile infant. Dissent discusses findings mirroring allegations in the petition.

Vacated order eliminating reunification due to contradictory findings.

Neglect adjudication affirmed for newborn. Discusses post-petition evidence relevant to the existence or nonexistence of the allegations in the petition.

Vacated portion of order ceasing reunification and remanded for trial court to make appropriate finding about whether reasonable efforts should be ceased under G.S. 7B-901(c).

Insufficient findings to support adjudication of neglect and dependent juvenile involving infant. Findings do not establish both parents were unable to provide proper care or supervision and lacked appropriate alternative care arrangements.

TPR affirmed based on neglect. Discusses lack of explanation for juvenile injuries in determining likelihood of future neglect.

TPR affirmed. Court did not abuse discretion in deciding to exclude mother's expert witness testimony at disposition.

No abuse of discretion when considering G.S. 7B-1110(a) factors to determine TPR in best interests of the child. Trial court found no parent-child bond.

Order granting TPR on grounds of failure to make reasonable progress determined to be sufficient with minimal findings.

First-degree murder conviction and the fact DSS will not engage father with service plan supports determination of likelihood of future neglect.

Mother's mistake in filing her notice of appeal of TPR order addressed to the Supreme Court did not warrant dismissal of her appeal.

No abuse of discretion in denial of motion to continue TPR hearing. Respondent father failed to show there were extraordinary circumstances warranting a further continuance.

No abuse of discretion in denying incarcerated respondent mother's motion for continuance for which she failed to show justifiable extraordinary circumstances.

TPR affirmed based on father's failure to pay. Sporadic provision of gifts, food, and clothing does not preclude finding.

TPR affirmed. Findings support conclusion that father failed to pay reasonable portion of cost of care during determinative six months though continuously employed.

The court did not abuse its discretion in not holding a hearing to determine mother’s competency or appointing a Rule 17 GAL.

TPR based on neglect affirmed. Court made sufficient findings to determine mother did not have the ability to provide proper care, supervision, and discipline at the time of the hearing.

TPR based on willful abandonment affirmed. Discusses incarcerated parent and available means to show interest in child.

TPR based on neglect affirmed.

Appellate court will not reweigh the evidence relevant to a trial court's G.S. 7B-1110(a) best interests findings. Trial court considered the factors and the findings were supported by the evidence.

No abuse of discretion when determining TPR was in the children's best interests. Court considered and made findings for relevant G.S. 7B-1110(a) factors, including language and culture considerations under the catchall factor, "any relevant consideration."

Adjudication of neglect cannot be based solely on prior DSS involvement related to other children.

TPR affirmed based on failure to pay. In-kind contributions acknowledged but do not supplant court-ordered payments.

Required findings under G.S. 7B-905.1 were not met where court ordered no visits with incarcerated mother and did not address mother's visitation rights upon her imminent release.

TPR affirmed. Respondent mother failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel.

TPR affirmed. Respondent mother failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel.

TPR reversed. Motion with attached orders from underlying juvenile case failed to allege sufficient facts to warrant a determination that a ground exists.

Trial court's findings of fact did not permit meaningful appellate review and were insufficient to support the trial court's denial of the TPR petition.

Father precluded from making a collateral attack on underlying juvenile orders during appeal of TPR.

TPR affirmed. Findings sufficient to support conclusion of willful abandonment.

TPR affirmed. Sufficient findings to support grounds of neglect.

DV and failure to follow case plan show neglect likely to be repeated for juvenile who lived in home where other juveniles were neglected.

Opinion addresses minimum outline for visits, virtual visits, and notice of motion to review visits.

DSS provided reasonable efforts to mother.

No abuse of discretion in denying mother's motion to continue when she was not present.

4-3 opinion. Denial of father's continuance was error. Discussion of due process rights and fundamental fairness in TPR where court denied father's motion to continue when he could not participate due to a lockdown at his prison because of COVID-19 restrictions.

Findings support court's determination of a likelihood of future neglect. TPR affirmed.

The findings about father not attempting to contact mother or family when he had the ability to do so support the court's determination that he acted willfully and abandoned his child.

TRP vacated and remanded. Some findings were unsupported by the evidence. Discussion of father's substance use and whether that is sufficient to TPR on neglect or failure to make reasonable progress.

Facts: Father appeals an adjudication of his two daughters based upon sexual abuse, arguing the court erred by admitting over his objection a child medical exam (CME) that contained hearsay

TPR affirmed on ground of neglect. Rejected father's argument that prior neglect was not caused by him.

Poverty was not the basis for terminating mother's rights under G.S. 7B-1111(a)(2).

Court considered parent-child bond. TPR affirmed.

Past neglect does not require the parent to have been responsible for the neglect adjudication. TPR affirmed

Findings are supported by evidence and support conclusion of neglect, including likelihood of repetition of neglect.

Unchallenged findings support likelihood of future neglect. Due to cognitive limitations mother was unable to understand why children came into care and cannot function or parent independently.

Challenged findings in the TPR dispositional order were supported by the evidence. No abuse of discretion in granting TPR.

TPR affirmed. Findings of father's incapacity were supported by the evidence and unchallenged findings supported ground of dependency.

Findings did not address impact of housing instability, drug use, and mental health on the children. The 5th Amendment privilege cannot be used as a sword and a shield.

No abuse of discretion in ceasing visitation with mother and eliminating reunification as a permanent plan. DSS made reasonable efforts.

Completion of case plan did not preclude finding of likelihood of future neglect. Mother did not show she gained any insight from her plan and still could not protect her children.

No abuse of discretion in determining TPR in child's best interests: parent-child bond, likelihood of adoption

Mother did not meet burden of showing extraordinary circumstances existed for continuance of TPR under GS 7B-1109(d) or that she was prejudiced by denial of motion to continue.

Neglect adjudication affirmed. Business record exception applied to drug test results. There was harm to the juvenile and a substantial risk of harm.

TPR on neglect affirmed as there was evidence to support finding of likelihood of repetition of neglect. Discussion of Rule 52 and findings.

District court had subject matter jurisdiction as verification of motion was not defective. Discussion of verification under Rule 11 and G.S. 1-148 as well as substantial compliance with Notary Public Act.

TPR on willful abandonment affirmed. Court found father's testimony not credible. Findings were supported by evidence and supported conclusion. Father did send one card and gift during the determinative time period, but it was not a sincere effort.

Findings are supported by DSS social worker testimony and support conclusion of likelihood of future neglect.

Neglect adjudication reversed and remanded. Court did not make ultimate findings regarding substantial risk of harm to the child. Discussion of mirroring allegations in the petition.

NC had jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to modify a NY custody order. The exception to subject matter jurisdiction based on a party's unjustifiable conduct (GS 50A-208) does not apply. Assuming it did, the exceptions in GS 50-208(a)(1), (2) apply.

Pending action for legislative amendment applied. Eliminate reunification requires G.S. 7B-906.2(b) and (d) findings.

No abuse of discretion in BIC determination. Lack of adoptive placement is not a bar to TPR; child's behaviors were improving.

Court did not determine likelihood of future neglect based solely on father's lengthy probation but also on his failure to inquire about the child's wellbeing since his arrest up to the time of the TPR hearing.

TPR on abandonment affirmed.

Private TPR on abandonment affirmed. Findings are supported by the evidence.

Unchallenged findings are binding and challenged findings were supported by the evidence. No abuse of discretion.

Court did not apply a misapprehension of law re: time period of parent's progress given it overruled DSS objection about post-petition evidence. Judge is presumed to have disregarded incompetent evidence and mother did not show reliance on that evidence. Findings on all evidence presented is not required.

Findings support conclusion of willful abandonment. Judge has authority to determine witness credibility and draw/reject inference from the evidence when there is conflicting evidence.

The findings do not support eliminating reunification and awarding guardianship. Discussion of parents acting inconsistently with their parental rights and required findings under G.S. 7B-906.2(b) and (d). Important factor was another child was born and remained in the home with the parents.

Mother did not argue and cannot show prejudice on IAC claim. There is a dissent that would have remanded for further factfinding on counsel's performance.

There were no findings of the likelihood of future neglect.

Findings support conclusion of dependent juveniles.

No abuse of discretion when ordering 1 hour of supervised visits a week.

Reversing TPR. No evidence child was born out of wedlock or that father did not take any of the 5 actions enumerated in G.S. 7B-1111(a)(5).

Current neglect by abandonment does not required the 2-part test of prior neglect and likelihood of future neglect. Findings were insufficient to support conclusion regarding neglect by abandonment/abandonment. Findings recited testimony and did not resolve material conflict in evidence. Reversed and remanded.

Relying on stare decisis and In re S.E., 373 N.C. 360 (2020), parent has an inherent duty to support their child. Lack of notice is not a defense re: willfulness on the grounds under G.S. 7B-1111(a)(3).

At adjudication stage of TPR, parent's constitutional rights over child's best interest prevail. At disposition, child's best interests is the polar star.

G.S. 7B-1111(a)(4) applies when a parent has a court order of custody/agreement and a child support order/agreement. Here, petitioner was grandmother. No evidence mother had a court order/agreement for custody and child support.

Court did not err in denying mother's motion to continue TPR adjudicatory hearing. Offer of proof of potential witness testimony was vague. No prejudice.

• G.S. 7B-1111(a)(7) authorizes a TPR when a parent willfully abandons their child for 6 months immediately preceding the filing of the TPR. Willfulness is a question of fact.

TPR on neglect affirmed. Findings were supported by the evidence and were not based on speculation regarding the likelihood of repetition of neglect. Appellate court will not reweigh the evidence.

Evidence supported findings that mother had an inability or unwillingness to establish a safe home. Prior TPR was not challenged.

Father did not preserve issue involving exclusion of his testimony when he failed to make an offer of proof. Dispositional phase gives court greater discretion to receive evidence. There is no burden of proof for any party at dispositional stage. Application of clear, cogent, and convincing evidence standard did not prejudice father.

No abuse of discretion in findings re: likelihood of adoption and parent's bond with child.

Guardianship affirmed. Evidence supported findings and findings supported conclusion that mother acted inconsistently with her parental rights, guardian understood legal significance of appointment, and reunification efforts would be unsuccessful or inconsistent with the children's health or safety.

Appeal under G.S. 7B-1001(a)(5) dismissed without prejudice as being premature. Opinion superseded by unpublished opinion.

Subject matter jurisdiction in a TPR does not require the action be filed in the same county where there is an underlying A/N/D action.

Findings were supported by the evidence and support the conclusion. Court had authority to determine mother's recent progress was not reasonable given historical facts of the case.

Explicit findings demonstrating jurisdiction under the UCCJEA are not required, rejecting parent's argument that G.S. 7B-1101 requires such a finding. The record must reflect the circumstances for UCCJEA jurisdiction exist.

TPR on neglect affirmed. Discusses what constitutes a finding, appellate review of findings, and judicial notice. Mother's progress was extremely limited and supporting finding that there was a likelihood of repetition of neglect.

Trial court held a proper adjudicatory hearing when testimony by DSS social worker reaffirmed under oath the allegations in the TPR petition. Affirmed in part.

Findings do not address the determinative 6-month time period under G.S. 7B-1111(a)(3). There is a dissent in part (4-3)

There was no evidence about mother's progress up to the time of the TPR hearing.

There was no evidence of the circumstances at the time of the TPR hearing. Court could not conclude parent did not have ability to provide proper care and supervision.

"Services Needed" is treated the same as "substantiated." DSS was required to file petition when respondent refused to comply with in-home services plan. Evidence supports adjudication of neglected juveniles.

Order vacated and remanded for application of clear and convincing evidence standard re: parent acting inconsistently with her constitutionally protected status as a parent.

Findings were insufficient and not supported by competent evidence to support neglect or dependency adjudications. Discussion of findings, ultimate findings, conclusions of law. Reversed for dismissal. There is a dissent. Reasonable efforts also discussed.

Father's refusal to cooperate with DSS, complete the services before he could exercise visitation, and failure to modify the visitation order during the determinative 6-month time period support the willful abandonment ground. His post-TPR-motion behavior is not a bar to the TPR.

No ineffective assistance of counsel when attorney did not advise father to execute AOP or legally establish paternity. This is an inherit duty and attorney's alleged failure is not prejudicial and would not have changed outcome of TPR on 7B-1111(a)(5).

No abuse of discretion in granting TPR. Competent evidences supported the findings. Discussion of parental bond and dispositional alternatives.

Court did not abuse its discretion in not conducting inquiry into mother's competency even though she had an intellectual disability warranting services and supports.

G.S. 7B-1110(a) does not require findings about dispositional alternatives the court considered. No abuse of discretion.

Paternity affects a substantial right requiring the application of lex loci when multiple states of involved. Artificial insemination and birth occurred in VA. VA law should have applied. Remanded.

No abuse of discretion in denying father's request for a new attorney and Rule 17 GAL

Facts were insufficient for dependency ground, vacated and remanded.

TPR on willful abandonment affirmed. Father cannot use his incarceration as a shield.

Although the trial court applied the wrong time period when examining the parent's failure to make reasonable progress, it examined father's actions and made findings up to the date of the TPR hearing. Poverty is not an element of the ground such that an affirmative finding about poverty is not required. TPR affirmed.

The court has discretion to give greater weight to G.S. 7B-1110(a) factors than the child-parent bond.

Dependency affirmed based on death of sibling and refusal to believe it was intentional by possible caregivers and mother. There's also a neglect adjudication as well as consolidated TPR in this case.

Consolidated TPR and A/N/D adjudication and disposition put mother on notice that permanency will be at issue. GS 7B-901(c) aggravating factor found for initial dispositional hearing.

This is an appeal of a PPO together with a TPR. This opinion discusses the language of G.S. 7B-1001(a2), addressing insufficient findings in a PPO, supreme court precedent, and the appropriate remedy of remand.

TPR reversed and remanded. Court must comply with the ICWA inquiry of each participant as to whether they know or have reason to know the child is an Indian child.

The findings supporting the ground of neglect for TPR were not based solely on father's incarceration.

Mother was not entitled to a continuance based on her argument that she was denied due process rights against self-incrimination with a pending criminal charge. Discussion of GS 7B-803.

This opinion discusses judicial notice. The court improperly applied judicial notice. The other findings support the court's conclusion to award custody to father.

Court properly considered father's limitations in making progress to correct the conditions due to his incarceration, which including considering his behavior further limited his opportunities to engage in services and delayed his release date. There is a dissent.

The evidence does not support the findings, which do not support elimination reunification/reunification efforts when granting guardianship and waiving further reviews. This opinion discusses difficulty in securing housing and DSS's failure to make reasonable efforts. It is reversible error to not make statutory required findings (GS 7B-906.2(d), -906.1(n)).

This opinion reverses and remands a PPO that eliminates reunification as a permanent plan. It discusses reasonable efforts, constitutional rights, GS. 7B-906.2(b) and (d) findings. Evidence does not support the findings to support the conclusion. It distinguishes In re Y.Y.E.T.

Mother's recent progress on her case plan in the 4 months before the TPR hearing was not enough to rectify the issues that led to the child's prior adjudication of neglect based on her substance use. TPR on neglect affirmed.

Findings regarding mother's failure to make reasonable progress to correct conditions re: domestic violence were supported by the evidence. TPR affirned.

TPR on neglect and BIC affirmed. LIkelihood of future neglect determination was supported by the evidence and was not defeated by recent progress mother started making after TPR filed. No abuse of discretion in determining TPR was in BIC.

Trial court determines credibility of testimony, the weight of the evidence, and the inferences to be drawn. Here, father's conduct over 5 years supported court's conclusion that he willfully abandoned children during the relevant 6-month period.

Findings supported conclusion that mother failed to make reasonable progress on her case plan involving substance use.

Discussing how efforts to reunify were not reasonable efforts.

This opinion discusses Rule 63 - the role of a substitute judge and held the actions were more than ministerial such that the orders were a nullity. It further discusses stipulations of fact and what may be relied upon for an adjudication.

Opinion discusses verification of custodian's understanding of legal significance of placement.

The opinion affirms a TPR that is challenged for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It addresses 7B-1101, the UCCJEA, the parent's age of minority, and transfer of the child's custody to her parent's resident state of VA.

The opinion discussed findings that are not supported by the evidence and reverses a TPR on abandonment under G.S. 7B-1111(a)(1) and (a)(7).

4-3 TPR opinion, reversing in part, and vacating and remanding in part. This opinion discusses the need for evidence and findings about the existence of an enforceable child support order the year before the TPR petition is filed.

TPR on dependency reversed. No evidence or findings of respondent's inability to provide proper care/supervision at the time of the TPR hearing.

Errors in the challenged findings were harmless given related unchallenged findings. The findings support the conclusion of a likelihood of future neglect. TPR affirmed.

Findings are unsupported by the evidence. The conclusion of law that parent acted inconsistently with her constitutionally protected rights is based on unsupported findings and is error.

The evidence and findings support the likelihood of future neglect. This 54 page opinion addresses finances, budgeting, housing, parenting skills, ability to respond to frustration, mental health treatment, and responding to a complex schedule to address the children's mental health needs. The TPR ground is found. There is a dissent addressing parent's substantial compliance with the case plan and poverty.

Discussion of the role of the parent's GAL in a TPR. Respondent failed to show reversible error by his GAL. TPR affirmed

This opinion interprets G.S. 7B-1111(a)(6) and holds a permanent guardian, regardless of whether the parent identified that person, is an appropriate alternative child care arrangement such that dependency cannot be found for purposes of a TPR. This opinions differs from prior Court of Appeals opinions. There is a dissent.

This opinion reverses and remands for a new hearing a TPR based on mother not knowingly and voluntarily waiving her right to counsel and by the court allowing her privately retained attorney to withdraw. A discussion of what inquiries the court is required to make is included in this opinion. There is a dissent.

A stepparent is a caretaker and does not have standing to appeal.

Neglect adjudication reversed and petition dismissed. The trial court relied solely on an adjudication of a sibling without any finding about risk of harm to these juveniles.

Discussion of signatures on notice of appeal by attorney for mother and her Rule 17 GAL.

The required findings under G.S. 7B-906.2(b) and (d) were not made when the court eliminated reunification as a permanent plan and ceased reunification efforts.

TPR on ground of dependency affirmed. Mother's continued extended incarceration supports the court's conclusion that she is incapable of providing care and supervision. Her release date ranging from 22 -42 months after the TPR hearing is the foreseeable future and the trial court's finding of the later, rather than earlier date, does not prejudice mother.

TPR on ground of neglect affirmed. Unchallenged findings support substantial risk of harm to the juvenile and the likelihood of future neglect.

Mother's attorney's actions of a brief cross examination of the one adjudication witness and a conciliatory closing argument was not disparaging of mother such that the performance was deficient or would prejudiced mother such that there was a reasonable probability of a different result.

The court determines the weight and credibility of the evidence. The court's findings for the determinative 2-year period, time before that period, and time after the TPR petition was filed support the conclusion of willful abandonment in this private TPR.

No abuse of discretion in determining TPR was in the 15 year old's best interest and in finding it was also in his best interests to waive his consent to his adoption. Father did not preserve issue of the juvenile's statutory due process rights.

The court determined weight and credibility of the evidence. The unchallenged findings support the conclusion that father made minimal progress in his case plan - a plan he had notice of through the court orders that required him to comply with the case plan.

This opinion discusses whether a court is required to sua sponte make an inquiry into a parent's incompetency for purposes of a Rule 17 GAL. In this case the parent was adjudicated incompetent and appointed a guardian of the person under Ch. 35A. The court in the TPR case did not abuse its discretion in not conducting an inquiry.

TPR on dependency reversed because there was no evidence or findings about the lack of an appropriate alternative child care arrangement.

The standard of review for best interests is an abuse of discretion and is not de novo. A strong bond between a parent-child is only one factor for the court to consider, and the court determines how much weight to give the factors.

Private TPR on basis of neglect is affirmed. Review of facts that support conclusion of past neglect (without DSS involvement) and likelihood of future neglect.

The court did not abuse its discretion in not taking additional evidence on remand. The new findings support the conclusion of neglect.

DSS had standing to file TPR petition. The court had jurisdiction to enter a nonsecure custody order on a motion of DSS in an action where the petition was file in 2008 since the court retained jurisdiction in the action.

A Ch. 50 order without juvenile court involvement is not a court order removing the child for purposes of G.S. 7B-1111(a)(2).

The findings support the court's conclusion that there is a likelihood of neglect. TPR affirmed. There is a dissent.

The 12-month period of willfully leaving a child in foster care or placement outside the home under G.S. 7B-1111(a)(2) does not include a period of time when the minor parent and the juvenile were placed together in the same foster home because there was no separation between the parent and juvenile. TPR reversed. There is a dissent.

The TPR for neglect discusses abandonment and likelihood of repetition of neglect and mother's disability. TPR is reversed. There is a dissent.

TPR reversed and remanded to address willfulness prong when findings identify other possible factors for mother's conduct, including her disability. There is a dissent.

Findings are sufficient to support conclusion that parents each willfully failed to make reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to their children's removal under G.S. 7B-1111(a)(2). The findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence. Mother is collaterally estopped from challenging conditions of removal.

The court determines the weight to give to the dispositional factors, including the bond between the parent and child when determining best interests. The child's best interests remain paramount. There was no abuse of discretion.

There was no abuse of discretion in denying the father's request to continue the TPR hearing beyond 90 days. See G.S. 7B-1109(d).

This case discusses father's willful failure to make reasonable progress to correct the conditions of the child's removal when the child was removed from mother's care,. A nexus in father's case plan and those conditions existed. Although father was incarcerated, the court considered the limitation. There is a dissent.

TPR for willful abandonment affirmed. Discusses incarceration and limitations on respondent father as well as the conduct occurring outside of the determinative 6-month period. There is a dissent.

Father's delay in obtaining a psychosexual evaluation resulting in it being provided to the attorney the day before the TPR hearing does not meet the extraordinary circumstances criteria of G.S. 7B-1109(d) for granting a continuance. Father waived his constitutional argument for the basis of the continuance. The review is an abuse of discretion, which did not occur. Continuances are disfavored.

The findings are support by clear and convincing evidence. The findings of mother's lack of reasonable progress in complying with her case plan and it being willful support the conclusion that grounds exists under G.S. 7B-1111(a)(2).

This opinion discusses the one year time period for waiving reviews and a court error in terminating jurisdiction when it needed to continue with DSS providing reasonable efforts for the secondary plan of reunification.

G.S. 7B-906.1(e)(1) requires court to make finding about whether it is possible for juvenile to be placed with a parent within the next 6 months, which did not occur when the court ordered guardianship at a permanency planning hearing.

Evidence supported findings that one child was abused and neglected as mother took and disseminated pornographic pictures of him and the sibling was neglected.

A court may not delegate its judicial function re: visitation, and the order must include notice of the right to request a review.

Evidence and findings support conclusion of willful abandonment by mother. There is a dissent.

There was no abuse of discretion in the court's determination that TPR was in child's best interests.

Credible evidence supports the findings, even when there was contrary evidence to support a different finding. Statutory language for findings is not required if the substance of the statute is met.

G.S. 7B-602(a1) requires findings that a parent's waiver of counsel is knowing and voluntary.

Clear and convincing evidence supported findings about ongoing concerns with unstable housing, DV, and substance abuse. Findings supported conclusion parents acted inconsistently with their parental rights such that guardianship order could be based on best interests. There is a dissent.

The ICWA notices were deficient and the deficiencies were not cured with a notices sent during the post-TPR proceeding. The trial court must ensure notices are sent to each relevant tribe and the Bureau of Indian affairs and can only make a determination as to whether ICWA does not apply after the tribes & BIA fail to respond to multiple requests.

Written findings under G.S. 7B-1110(a) are only required when there is conflicting evidence. There was no evidence presented at the dispositional stage about the availability of maternal grandmother as a placement.

Appeal of PPO that eliminated reunification and a TPR. There is no burden of proof in a permanency planning hearing and court's misstatement of applying a clear, cogent, and convincing evidence standard was not prejudicial. The findings addressed the substance of G.S. 7B-906.2. The court did not abuse its discretion in reducing visitation.

Affidavits were competent evidence to support findings under G.S. 50A-207(b).

Unchallenged findings support adjudication of emotional abuse.

Adjudication of dependency affirmed; discussion of use of post-petition evidence.

Court must address who pays and ability to pay if a parent when ordering supervised visitation at a visitation center.

At initial disposition, court may rely on reports and findings in adjudication order. Court did not err in not taking sworn testimony since no new evidence was presented. G.S. 7B-901(a).

Findings of fact for one child are supported by the evidence and support the conclusion of neglect. Findings of fact for the sibling do not support a neglect adjudication based on the child living in the home where another child has been abused.

Adjudication of emotional abuse affirmed.

In the 4-3 opinions, TPR for failure to make reasonable progress was affirmed. The issues include substance use and methadone treatment, housing, and having another child reside in mother's care.

Evidence and findings support the conclusion that father lacked the ability to provide a safe home and that there was a prior TPR. Father's conduct was characteristic of his diagnosis of anti-social personality disorder.

Child's best interests are paramount consideration in disposition of TPR.

Pre-adoptive homes are by nature potential preadoptive homes.

In this 4-3 opinion, TPR affirmed. The court did not compare relationship between child and mother and child and foster parent. No abuse of discretion.

TPR for neglect and dependency reversed. Findings are unsupported by evidence and are based on conjecture. Issues involving completion of a case plan, domestic violence, treatment, and housing are discussed in this opinion.

There was no need for an alias and pluries summons or endorsement when the court permitted an amended TPR with summons and referred to them as a new filing.

TPR vacated and remanded for sufficient findings of fact. Grounds and ground are used interchangeably.

Evidence was sufficient to support findings that were sufficient to support neglect conclusion. Domestic violence was involved in this case.

Dependency adjudication reversed as there were no findings about the alternative childcare arrangement and the findings and evidence showed the child with living with a parent who was willing and able to provide care and supervision. This case involves unstable housing and a lack of employment.

An abuse, neglect, and dependency adjudication is about the circumstances and conditions surrounding the child and not the culpability of the parent. This opinion discusses an abuse adjudication and challenge to findings of fact and conclusions of law related to mother, which were held to be without merit.

• Facts: This case involves an appeal of an adjudication of an abused and neglected infant and an adjudication of a neglected juvenile, the infant’s 8-year old sibling who was living in t

Discovery in an A/N/D action is governed by G.S. 7B-700. Information sharing must first occur and if additional information is needed, the party seeking that information may file a motion for discovery. These juvenile procedures control, not the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The findings support the court's conclusion that the juvenile suffered serious emotion damage resulting in an adjudication of abuse and neglect. The facts involve the juvenile's exposure to her parents' high conflict relationship.

Respondent father did not meet his burden of showing the court lacked modification jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. Findings are not required, but the record must show jurisdiction exists. Here, the record showed NC was the child's home state, which was the issue in this appeal.

There was no abuse in discretion when the trial court denied mother's motion to continue the TPR. She did not make a showing of extraordinary circumstances as required by G.S. 7B-1109(d).

The standard of review for a best interests disposition is an abuse of discretion. Written findings of the relevant factors under G.S. 7B-1110(a) were made. Relevant factors do not include factors based on uncontested evidence.

There was no abuse of discretion in determining TPR was in the children's best interests. This case distinguishes In re J.A.O., which involved a TPR for a juvenile with significant behavioral issues and the likelihood of adoption factor under G.S. 7B-1110(a).

Upon review of order and hearing transcript, the necessary findings were made under G.S. 7B-906.1(n) to waive further reviews.

Evidence and findings were sufficient for court's verification that guardians understand the legal significance of their appointment as guardians.

Affirming TPR on dependency ground. Child's mental health needs requiring a Level III PRFT upon discharge from Level IV PRTF made placement with relative an inappropriate and unavailable child care arrangement.

On remand from NC Supreme Court, the COA reaffirmed its earlier holding reversing the TPR based on neglect and failure to make reasonable progress based on insufficient evidence and findings.

The evidence supported the findings that father (who was incarcerated 14 months of the 2 years the child was in DSS custody) made minimal progress on his case plan and reunification. The findings support the conclusion of neglect (past and likelihood of future neglect).

The findings of fact support the conclusion that abandonment under G.S. 7B-1111(a)(7) exist.

• Facts: In 2017, mother filed a petition to terminate father’s parental rights on the ground of willful abandonment.

The court did not abuse its discretion when determining the child's best interests was served by the TPR. In this private TPR, a permanent plan does not exist, and the likelihood of adoption is not relevant when the mother/petitioner has full custody of the juvenile.

Reviewing father's 3-month period of sobriety in the context of the 22 months the children were outside the home, the court made appropriate findings about the likelihood of future neglect and failure to make reasonable progress.

When juvenile turned 18 during pendency of appeal, case became moot as district court no longer has jurisdiction. No exception to the mootness doctrine applies.

Respondent did not meet her burden of showing the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.

Mother had an ability to work and pay a portion of the cost of the children's care. Her payment of zero is based on her own conduct in quitting her job and not seeking an alternative provider to manage her Rx. Additionally, she did not seek to modify a child support order.

Nexus existed between elements of case plan and reasons for child's removal. Findings that mother failed to make any progress on her case plan were supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and supported the conclusion that mother failed to make reasonable progress to correct conditions leading to child's removal after willfully leaving child in foster care for one year.

Findings were insufficient to support likelihood of future neglect. Issue involved respondent's incarceration, substance use, criminal history, and domestic violence. The TPR was vacated and remanded for further proceedings.

The court did not abuse its discretion in not conducting an inquiry into mother's competency and need for a GAL under G.S. 7B-1101.1(c).

There was no bias warranting recusal when judge made statement at TPR that explained the permanency planning order that placed the child with a relative in New Jersey because of a belief that the child could not live with the parents.

Finding of mother's prioritization of relationship with father, who did not comply with case plan and was violent toward mother and children, over the children's safety was supported by evidence and supported conclusion that she failed to make reasonable progress to correct the conditions leading to the children's removal

The opinion affirms abuse based on serious physical injury by nonaccidental means as shown by bruising on a 3 year old

This case applies the holding of In re B.O.A., 831 S.E.2d 305 (2019) and overrules In re H.H., 237 N.C. App. 432 (2014) and In re W.V., 204 N.C. App. 290 (2010) when looking at court's authority to order a parent to remedy conditions that directly or indirectly causes the child's removal from the home.

This opinion discusses TPR based on abandonment under G.S. 7B-1111(a)(1) and (7) and vacates and remands due to insufficient findings. Findings are discussed as well as the court's authority to question witnesses during trial.

Evidence of mother's current compliance with substance abuse treatment showed an ability to parent at the time of the adjudicatory hearing and therefore there was no dependency.

This opinion reverses a neglect adjudication based on insufficient findings. It discusses judicial notice of a prior nonsecure custody order as well as a lack of findings regarding risk of harm related to marijuana use by parents and chronic absenteeism from school.

Under G.S. 7B-906.1(n)(1), the period of at least one year means an uninterrupted period of at least 12 months in the same placement.

This opinion affirms a permanency planning order that achieves a permanent plan of guardianship, eliminates a secondary plan, and discusses findings and evidentiary issues to support the order.

Competent evidence requires oral testimony at a permanency planning hearing.

The findings support the conclusion of abandonment during the relevant 6-month time period. Past conduct may be considered to evaluate intent and credibility. Incarceration and defeating a prior TPR do not preclude the court from granting a TPR based on evidence that supports the findings to support a conclusion of abandonment.

This opinion discusses the dispositional phase of TPR and the child's best interests based on the purposes of the Juvenile Code and factors identified in G.S. 7B-1110(a). The TPR was denied and the supreme court affirmed that decision. There is a dissent.

Father's conduct was sufficient to support a TPR based on willful abandonment. Father could have filed a motion to modify the temporary custody order that prohibited contact between him and the children, yet he did not take any such action. The court's determination that TPR was in the children's best interests was not an abuse of discretion.

Appellate “Rule 3.1 mandates an independent review on appeal of the issues contained in a no-merit brief….” Sl. Op. at 1. In re L.V. is overruled.

This opinion discusses the application of the UCCJEA to a 7B case when the court has retained jurisdiction.

A TPR based on neglect and failure to make reasonable progress is reversed. The facts do not support the conclusion. Compliance with the case plan, including housing, is discussed.

This opinion discusses modification jurisdiction under the UCCJEA when there was an initial custody determination in another state and whether NC had modification jurisdiction to proceed with a TPR. Although both parents and the child moved from the original state, mother (non-custodial parent) returned to that state and was presently residing there when the NC TPR action commenced. Without a finding by the out-of-state court that it no longer had continuing exclusive jurisdiction, NC lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.

There is not statutory or constitutional right to an Anders type appellate review in a TPR.

The record is insufficient to determine whether mother was denied effective assistance of counsel when mother was not present at hearing and attorney did not advocate at hearing but did file motion to dismiss and an answer. No reasons are provided and it is unclear what state mother was in at the time of the TPR hearing or what direction she may have given her attorney or GAL. The appropriate remedy is remand for the trial court to determine whether the representation was deficient.

This opinion discusses the precedent set by In re H.L. and In re C.P. that allows the trial court at the first permanency planning hearing (PPH) to cease reunification efforts but requires that reunification be a primary or secondary permanent plan. In this case, the evidence and facts support the cessation of reunification efforts, but the trial court erred in not including reunification as one of the permanent plans at the first PPH.

Insufficient record on appeal to address mother's argument that a G.S. 7B-910 review of foster care placement was required in case where mother placed child with family friend before any DSS involvement and then via a family services agreement allowed younger child to also be placed in the family friend's home.

DSS cannot take a different position on appeal from what it argued at trial.

The appeal of the permanency planning order "ceasing reunification efforts" was rendered moot by the proper TPR, which relied on evidence about current conditions and not findings of conclusions in the PPO.

Plaintiff's failure to exercise due diligence to locate and serve Defendant resulted in improper service by publication. Dismissal is appropriate.

Foster parents were not parties and did not participate as parties even though they testified as the child's current placement provider through direct examination by their attorney. Foster parent's attorney also questioned on direct and redirect an expert called by the GAL attorney advocate who requested foster parent attorney conduct the examination of the expert witness.

Court must indicate the standard of clear and convincing evidence when determining a parent is unfit or has acted inconsistently with her constitutionally protected rights.

There was competent evidence to support the findings of fact and conclusion of law that the newborn was a neglected juvenile. This case has an extensive appellate procedural history based on the proper standard of review to be applied (the court of appeals may not reweigh the underlying evidence).

This opinion reverses a TPR on the ground of G.S. 7B-1111(a)(4) because of (1) insufficient notice pleading to respondent father and (2) insufficient findings to support the conclusion the ground existed.

This opinion discusses Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403 in a trial for a first-degree sex offense with a child. It holds the admission of the victim's testimony regarding two prior acts by the defendant that were strikingly similar to the act for which he was charged - digital penetration of the same victim while she was in defendant's care - was not an error.

Although the order sets for the minimim length, frequency, and whether visitation is supervised as required by G.S. 7B-905.1, it does not address the cost of visitation and whether respondent mother has an ability to pay (if she is to bear the cost).

There was no evidence to support the findings that the respondent father failed to take each of the required actions of G.S. 7B-1111(a)(5) (failure to legitimate).

There was no abuse of discretion in ordering custody to the father as the child's permanent plan, based on the child's best interests.

This case distinguishes the requirements of an Anders review in criminal cases and NC Appellate Rule 3.1(d), which applies to juvenile cases. App. Rule 3.1(d) does not require the appellate court conduct an independent review of the record; however, the court of appeals has discretion to conduct the review when appropriate.

This opinion discusses App. Rule 3.1(d). The court of appeals may invoke App. Rule 2 to suspend the mandatory requirements under App. Rule 3.1(d) to serve a client with a no-merit brief, record, transcript, and notice of the right to file a pro se brief. The decision to invoke App. Rule 2 is made on a case-by-case basis, and here it applied when appellate counsel made exhaustive efforts to serve the client.

Appeal of  TPR under App. Rule 3.1(d) is dismissed as respondent father's pro se brief was untimely and failed to preserve or argue issues for appellate review. There is a concurrence and dissent.

A TPR based on failure to pay child support requires the petitioner to prove there was a child support order. There was no evidence of any child support order requiring reversal of the TPR.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when allowing the children's out-of-court statements disclosing their father's sexual abuse to (1) DSS social workers, (2) forensic evaluation interviewers, and (3) law enforcement as a residual hearsay exception. This opinion discusses the factors when applying Rule 803(24).

Respondent mother's American Indian heritage related to two federally recognized Indian tribes was sufficient to give the court reason to know the child is an Indian child requiring notice be sent to the Indian tribes re: the child's status as an Indian child under 25 U.S.C. 1903(4).

The permanency planning order awarding guardianship did not include findings about the parents' paramount constitutional rights, and respondents' did not waive those findings. Vacated and remanded for additional findings.  

The findings the respondent failed to make reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to the child's removal or adjudication are unsupported by the evidence. This case discusses implementation of skills learned from domestic violence classes and the requirement for the progress (or lack thereof) to be related to the reasons the child was removed. In this case, those reasons were based on domestic violence and a bruise and not substance abuse, mental health issues, or parenting skills.

When placing a child in out-of-home care, the trial court is required to consider placement with a willing and able relative who can provide a safe home and must place with that relative unless there is finding that such placement would be contrary to the child's best interests. Failure to make such findings and conclusions will result in a remand. 

A vacated order becomes void and has no effect. Upon remand, a new order may be appealed on any issue.

When respondent mother's attorney complied with N.C. App. Rule 3.1(d) and respondent did not file a pro se brief, there were no issues argued or preserved for appeal.

G.S. 7B-1002 specifies those parties that have a right to appeal and includes “a guardian appointed under G.S. 7B-600 or Chapter 35A of the General Statutes, or a custodian as defined in G.S. 7B-101 who is a nonprevailing party.” A dispositional order in a prior action is not subject to collateral attack in a subsequent action when the basis to void the order is non-jurisdictional. The appellants in this case, who had been awarded guardianship in a prior proceeding and before that legal and physical custody, had standing to appeal under G.S. 7B-1002.

Mother's admission was a stipulation and not a consent order. The findings from the admission about the child's poor school attendance and performance and missed doctor's visits do not support the conclusion of neglect. The incorporation by reference of the pre-adjudication order does not support the neglect adjudication. 

The trial court must make findings required by G.S. 7B-911(c) before terminating jurisdiction in the juvenile court proceeding.

Evidence was insufficient to support the court's findings verifying the custodians had adequate resources to appropriately care for the children and understood the legal significance of the placement as required by G.S. 7B-906.1(j).

In a neglect adjudication, a trial court may determine substantial risk of future abuse or neglect based on the historical facts of the case. The trial court determines how much weight to give the evidence. Here, the cumulative weight of the trial court's findings support the conclusion of neglect. The court of appeals may not reweigh the evidence.

Respondent father has the burden of proving he complied with all the requirements of G.S. 48-3-601(2)(b)(4)(II) for his consent to an adoption to be required. Here, he failed to show by a verifiable payment record that he made consistent and reasonable payments for the mother and/or child during the relevant time period, which is the period before the petition for adoption is filed.

Defendant’s offer of proof fell within Rule of Evidence 412(b)(2), one of four exceptions in the Rape Shield Statute - “evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior offered for the purpose of showing that the act or acts charged were not committed by the defendant." Results of the victim having STDs and the defendant not having STDs and a report by a proposed medical expert “affirmatively permit an inference that defendant did not commit the charged crime."

“The trial court ‘should not broadly incorporate written reports from outside sources as its findings of fact’ [and] … delegate its fact-finding duty” (quoting In re J.S., 165 N.C. App. 509, 511 (2004)).

The findings support termination of respondent's parental rights under the grounds of willfully failing to correct the conditions that led to the child's removal regarding two children and neglect regarding a third child. Findings about whether DSS made reasonable efforts toward reunification are required at permanency planning hearings and not a TPR, but even so, DSS provided reasonable efforts toward reunification (such efforts need not be exhaustive).

There was sufficient evidence of defendant’s actions pressuring her daughter to recant the daughter’s allegation of repeated sexual abuse by her adoptive father/defendant’s husband with the willful intent to hinder the investigation. There was insufficient evidence that defendant denied DSS or law enforcement access to her daughter to support an obstruction of justice charge on that basis. Defendant's failure to report child abuse without an allegation of an affirmative act does not support a conviction of accessory after the fact.

An adjudication of dependency under G.S. 7B-101(9) requires the trial court to address both prongs of the definition regarding (1) the parent’s ability to provide proper care or supervision and (2) the availability to the parent of alternative child care arrangements.

Permanent plan of guardianship did not include finding under G.S. 7B-906.1(e)(1). Respondent mother waived her right to findings about her acting inconsistently with her parental rights.

Before ordering custody to a non-parent, there must be clear and convincing evidence and a finding that a parent is unfit or has acted inconsistently with his or constitutionally protected status as a parent. This finding applies to a permanent custody order, even when custody is transferred from a non-parent (in this case DSS) to a different non-parent (in this case the foster parents).

"The law of the case doctrine does not apply when the evidence presented at a subsequent [TPR] proceeding is different from that presented on a former appeal,” which in this case is the six months next preceding the filing of the second (2016) petition alleging abandonment under G.S. 7B-1111(a)(7).

Without a transcript or narrative in the appellate record, findings of fact are deemed conclusive on appeal, and the review of an order eliminating reunification is limited to whether the findings support the decision to cease reunification. The ultimate finding under G.S. 7B-906.2(b) that reunification efforts clearly would be unsuccessful or inconsistent with the juvenile’s health and safety were supported by findings. 

Although the respondent had limited options to show her love, guidance, and affection for her child during an appeal of a previously granted TPR, she failed to attempt to make any efforts to contact or support her child or seek a stay of the TPR order. Those actions, coupled with her prior conduct, support the termination of parental rights on the ground of abandonment.

A placement made by a G.S. Chapter 50 civil custody order does not negate the ability of the custodian to adopt the child, despite the placement not being made pursuant to G.S. Chapter 48. The court may waive the placement requirement for cause. In a TPR, the court may consider the likelihood of the child's adoption in the dispositional phase when the placement is not made pursuant to G.S. Chapter 48.

In a review by the court of appeals upon request of respondent father's attorney when filing a no-merit brief pursuant to Appellate Rule 3.1(d), there was no error. The findings and conclusions in the TPR order were sufficient.

The mandate issues on the day the appellete court transmits the mandate to the lower court, not the day the lower court actually receives the mandate.

Findings, based on evidence, that respondent mother's progress on her case plan were limited were sufficient to support a determination of likelihood of future neglect. Where there was an underlying neglect adjudication with a determination of likelihood of reptition of neglect, the TPR was affirmed.

Findings related to alternative placement of child made by mother before petition filed by DSS and without DSS assistance do not support adjudication of dependency.

G.S. 7B-901(c)(1) requires a previous order finding facts supporting a determination that aggravating circumstances exist to order reasonable efforts for reunification are not required.

Orders that do not bear a file stamp or other indication that they were ever filed with the clerk of court have not been entered under Rule 58. Here, the orders were signed but not file stamped. Because they were not entered, the court of appeals has no jurisdiction to review them.

The court must make findings addressing both prongs of the dependency definition at G.S. 7B-101(9): the parent’s ability to provide proper care or supervision and the availability of an alternative child care arrangement. 

The court's G.S. 7B-906.2(b) finding that reunification efforts clearly would be unsuccessful or inconsistent with the juvenile’s health or safety may be made at the first permanency planning hearing. The court may consider the respondent’s failure to comply with a case plan that he voluntarily entered into before the petition was filed, even though there was no court order for him to participate in that plan, when considering whether reunification efforts would be (un)successful.

In a TPR neglect adjudication, the findings of fact must be supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, they must address the likelihood of repetition of neglect based on evidence of current circumstances, neither of which occurred in this case. This case includes circumstances where a man should not know he is the father of a child born out of wedlock.

Plaintiff was limited to one hour for the presentation of her case. She failed to request additional time or object and thus waived her right to appeal on the issue. Trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Standing is jurisdictional. For a non-parent to pursue a G.S. Chapter 50 custody action against a parent, she must show a substantial relationship with the child and that the parent acted inconsistently with her constitutionally protected status. The standard is clear and convincing evidence. There is no bright-line test for making the determination but the court must consider the parent's intentions. Pre-birth actions by the parent should be considered with the parent's actions taken after the child's birth. 

Discussing competent evidence to support the trial court's verification of a proposed guardians' adequate resources to appropriately care for the child, this opinion has a concurrence and a dissent and addresses previous published opinions on the issue. Although a close question, evidence supported the conclusion of adequate resources.

A juvenile may not be adjudicated "seriously neglected" as defined by G.S. 7B-101(19a).

ICWA applies when the proceeding is a "child custody proceeding" that involves an "Indian child" as both terms are defined by ICWA. Note this opinion does not apply the ICWA regulations that became effective December 12, 2016 as the TPR order was entered before that date.

Repondent's unexplained absence at TPR hearing did not implicate a constitutional right when her attorney requested a continuance. There was no abuse of discretion or prejudice to the respondent when the trial court denied the continuance request. Respondent's attorney fully participated in the hearing.

A trial court determines reasonable inferences to draw from the evidence. Findings, supported by competent evidence, that a pre-mobile infant who was in the sole care of respondents and who suffered serious non-accidental injuries that were not explained by the respondents support an adjudication of abuse. There was no shifting of the burden of proof from DSS to respondent. 

A court is not required to make findings under G.S. 7B-906.2(b) when it does not eliminate reunification as a concurrent permanent plan.

The court may not delegate its judicial function to determine visitation by allowing the guardian to unilaterally suspend or modify the visitation based on his or her concerns. 

When a child has been reunified with a parent, the court has waived reviews, and a new report is made resulting in an assessment by DSS that requires court action, G.S. 7B-401(b) applies. It requires that DSS file in the existing case a verified petition alleging the new allegations, and that the court conduct a new adjudicatory hearing and adjudicate the juvenile before moving to a dispositional hearing.

It is reversible error to waive further review hearings when the court does not make findings of each of the G.S. 7B-906.1(n) factors.

This opinion discusses temporary emergency jurisdiction at nonsecure custody; modification jurisdiction for adjudication and disposition; and due process arguments under the UCCJEA and Juvenile Code regarding jurisdictional issues. Subject matter jurisdiction is found and the underlying order is affirmed.

A trial court is not required to make findings of fact on all the evidence that is presented or state every option it considered as part of the best interest factor, “any relevant consideration”, set forth at G.S. 7B-1110(a)(6).

Respondents allowed to be inflicted or created a substantial risk of serious physical injury by other than accidental means by their failure to (1) maintain the special needs child's Rx and (2) provide adequate supervision, both of which resulted in injuries to the child (even if self-inflicted). 

The guardian’s return to North Carolina renders the issue of the applicability of the ICPC and respondent mother’s appeal moot.

It was not reversible error for court to fail to state in its consent adjudication order that the adjudicatory findings were based on the clear and convincing evidentiary standard under G.S. 7B-805 (applying to an adjudicatory hearing).

THIS OPINION HAS BEEN REVERSED BY THE N.C. SUPREME COURT. The opinion looked to the definition of director when holding Mecklenburg County DSS did not have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of district court because the child's residence was in Rowan County and the child was not found in Mecklenburg County when petition was filed. 

A respondent parent who is called as a witness by DSS is a compelled (not voluntary) witness, who can assert or waive the V Amendment privilege against self-incrimination once the testimonial response to the question would tend to incriminate the witness. Respondent mother, who invoked the privilege, did not waive her right to the privilege and should not have been ordered to answer. Respondent parent was prejudiced as a result. 

Failure to include findings of both prongs of dependency definition is reversible error.

GS 7B-903(a1) requires the court to consider relative placement and when not placing the child with a relative, make findings that the placement with a willing and available relative who can provide a safe home is contrary to the child's best interests. This finding is required even when an evaluation of the relative's home has not been completed.

Court must comply with 7B-911 and make required findings. "Custody order" is remanded for required findings regarding Chapter 50 action and to terminate 7B jurisdiction.

Incarceration alone does not support conclusion that respondent is unable to provide a safe home for the child, which is one of two required prongs to terminate parental rights under G.S. 7B-1111(a)(9). Adjudicatory findings (and not dispositional considerations) must support the conclusion that a ground exists.

The findings did not support the conclusion that the two prongs of GS 7B-1111(a)(2) were met. The opinion also raises but does not resolve the question of whether the respondent had sufficient notice of the ground alleged.

Before ordering a permanent plan of guardianship, the court must find a parent is unfit or acted inconsistently with his constitutionally protected status. The parent did not waive those findings in this case.

A parent is not criminally liable for for causing physical injury when administering corporal punishment unless that punishment causes lasting injury or is made with malicious purpose.

Based on the record, the court properly verified that the proposed guardian had adequate resources to appropriately care for the child. At the permanency planning hearing, there was evidence of the colloquy between court and proposed guardian, the department and GAL reports, and the court's judicial notice of a prior order that addressed the proposed guardian's prior care of the child.

Deficits in findings of fact required to cease reasonable efforts were not cured in TPR order.

The court may include third persons (in this case the victim's minor children) in a GS 15A-1340.50 permanent no contact order when there are findings that such contact would constitute indirect contact with the victim.

CAUTION! REVERSED AND REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration by In re J.A.M., 370 N.C. 464 (2018) requiring proper standard of review for findings of fact

The evidence and findings do not support the ground of dependency under G.S. 7B-1111(a)(6). Respondent father had recommended an appropriate alternative child care arrangement. Findings of father's drug use were not supported by the evidence and did not show that his drug use interfered with his ability to provide proper care and supervision to his child.

Regarding cease reunification, the court based its findings on competent evidence, which included the dss report that was admitted in evidence without objection and the social worker's testimony.

The findings did not support the courts conclusion that the parent willfully abandoned her child. The findings did not address the parent's limitations on her ability to visit with the child, attend the child's games, or communicate with the father-petitioner because of her incarceration and addiction issues.

A court’s ruling on a motion in limine is preliminary in nature, and a court may reconsider the admissibility of challenged evidence based on other evidence that is presented at trial. To preserve the underlying evidentiary issue, the party must attempt to introduce the evidence at trial.

NC had subject matter jurisdiction under G.S. 50A-203 to modify a prior custody order from Illinois. The Illinois court docket entry satisfied the court order requirement that IL was relinquishing jurisdiction to NC.

The district court has exclusive original jurisdiction over a judicial review of placement on the Responsible Individual List (RIL). The court's jurisdiction does not end when the juvenile turns 18 prior to the hearing.

After finding that a juvenile was abused by the respondent, who is a responsible individual, the court is mandated to conclude as a matter of law that the respondent be placed on the RIL.

Personal jurisdiction is obtained over defendent when (s)he is served while physically in North Carolina.

The stipulated facts supported the court's conclusion of neglect.

Custody to a non-parent requires verification that the proposed custodian (1) understands the legal significance of the order (this was proved) and (2) has adequate resources to care for the child (there was insufficient evidence to support this finding).

Based on the court's findings, there was no abuse of discretion when the court determined there would be no visitation under GS 7B-905.1 between the mother and her child.

An adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency requires a court hearing. Stipulations of fact or a consent agreement must be made on the record and comply with GS 7B-801, -802, and -807.

The trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to terminate respondent mother’s parental rights after the child’s GAL filed a verified motion to terminate parental rights.

A child may be adjudicated neglected when the evidence and findings show the child suffered non-accidental injuries while in her parents’ custody even though there is no explanation for how those injuries occurred.

When reading two orders together, the order established a visitation plan that includes supervision, duration, and frequency and complies with G.S. 7B-905.1.

A parent can show an interest in his child's welfare despite being incarcerated. In this case there was sufficient evidence provided through the DSS social worker that the father neglected his child.

The court must make findings of each 7B-906.1(n) factor to waive further permanency planning hearings.

When an order changes a previous order by adding a no contact provision regarding a child and her grandfather, that is a change in custody. That order may be appealed under G.S. 7B-1001(a)(4).

Regarding the effect of legislative changes on "pending" cases, the amendments do not apply to written orders that are entered after the effective date when the hearing that results in the written order occurred prior to the effective date of the amendments.

To order custody to a non-parent, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that parent has acted inconsistently with his or constitutionally protected interest to care, custody, and control of his or her child.

It is reversible error when the court does not make findings by clear and convincing evidence of all the enumerated factors in G.S. 7B-906.1(n) when ordering that permanency planning hearings are waived.

The court should not hold a permanency planning hearing when a parent objects on the basis of receiving an untimely, and therefore, deficient notice of the hearing.

Neglect adjudication requires findings that child has been harmed or is at substantial risk of suffering harm.

An unwed father satisfied all three statutory requirements mandating his consent to the child's adoption.

The trial court’s findings support the court’s conclusion that there would be a repetition of neglect based on the children living in an injurious environment because of their parents' continued incidents of domestic violence even after the children were removed from their home and adjudicated neglected.

G.S. 7B-904(d1)(3) authorizes the trial court in an A/N/D action to order a parent to “take appropriate steps to remedy conditions in the home that led to or contributed to the juvenile’s adjudication or to the court’s decision to remove custody of the children from the parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker," which in this case included making a budget.

G.S. 7B-101(1)e. defines abused juvenile as “[a]ny juvenile less than 18 years of age whose parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker . . . [c]reates or allows to be created serious emotional damage to the juvenile… evidenced by a juvenile’s severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or aggressive behavior toward [herself] or others.” The statute does not require a formal psychiatric diagnosis.

The non-parent failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the mother acted inconsistently with her protected parental status to care, custody, and control of her child. The mother never intended to permanently cede her parental rights to a non-parent. Also, the non-parent cannot simultaneously intentionally prevent the mother from having a relationship with her child and argue that the mother has failed to shoulder her burden to care for her child.

G.S. 7B-1000 authorizes a modification of an order based on a change in circumstances OR the needs of the juvenile. The evidence and court’s findings supported its conclusion that there was a substantial change in circumstances that affected the child’s general welfare and best interests since the entry of the review order.

When determining if termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court must consider factors specified in G.S. 7B-1110(a). The availability of a relative for placement is not one of the designated factors, and whether a relative is available is not determinative of the child’s best interests.

In misdemeanor child abuse action, the state introduced substantial evidence that Defendant created a “substantial risk of physical injury” to her 18-month child. Defendant’s reliance on findings of fact that supported conclusions of neglect in juvenile proceedings (7B actions) illustrate some circumstances that can create a substantial risk of harm to a child but are not determinative on the jury.

A TPR order shall be entered no later than 30 days after the completion of the hearing. A party may petition for a writ of mandamus when this time period is not met.

Both the Juvenile Code and adoption statutes differentiate between a parent and stepparent. G.S. 7B-101(3) includes stepparent in the definition of "caretaker." Caretakers do not have standing to take an appeal in an abuse, neglect, or dependency proceeding.

Completion of a case plan by a parent does not preclude a court's conclusion that grounds of neglect exist for TPR. When the ground is neglect, a court may look to the historical facts of the case when predicting whether neglect is likely to occur in the future.

The Confrontation Clause in a criminal trial does not apply to a 15 year old's nontestimonial statement made to a nurse as part of medical evaluation conducted at the Children's Advocacy Center. The primary purpose of the statement was for medical diagnosis and treatment to safeguard the child's mental and physical health.

A child with a severe mental illness and her sister are both neglected juveniles, based on their mother's continued failure to maintain meaningful mental health treatment for the child with severe mental illness and to mitigate the effects of that child's behavior on the child's sister.

On appeal, unchallenged findings of fact made by the court support challenged findings of fact.

Neglect is based on the circumstances and conditions surrounding a child, not on the fault of a parent. Children exposed to the same injurious environment are neglected even when some of the children have a parent from whom they were not removed available for placement.

District court lacks jurisdiction to issue custody review orders after DSS voluntarily dismisses a petition.

A county department social worker's testimony regarding events that occurred before her involvement with the case but which she learned of from the department's case record was admissible when the foundation for the business record exception to hearsay was established.

When a mother executes a relinquishment to the county department, the department obtains custody of the child. The other parent may have his rights terminated on the ground of failing to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for a child in department custody when the parent is physically and financially able to do so.

In a case in which a child has no "home state," the trial court determined North Carolina had initial child custody jurisdiction based on "significant connection jurisdiction."

The court had the authority under G.S. 7B-904 to order the respondent father to maintain stable employment and obtain a domestic violence assessment.

Remanded for the NC trial court to examine the Texas order and determine if TX exercised temporary emergency jurisdiction, exclusive continuing jurisdiction, or jurisdiction in substantial conformity with the UCCJEA when issuing its January 2014 order. Depending on the trial court’s determination of how the TX court exercised jurisdiction, the NC court must communicate with the TX court. If NC determines it does not have subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the petition.

In determining neglect, a court may consider whether another child who lives in the home has been abused or neglected by an adult who regularly resides in the home. A sibling who witnessed her brother's abuse was neglected even though she herself was not physically harmed.

Respondent mother was appropriately placed on RIL and was not deprived of her right to represent herself or retain her own attorney when her court appointed attorney in the A/N/D also represented her in the RIL hearing.

The definition of abuse at G.S. 7B-101(1)c. looks to the procedures or devices a parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker used to modify a child's behavior. It does not examine the child's behavior that the procedures or devices are meant to correct.

Neglect requires the child to experience a physical or emotional impairment or substantial risk of such impairment. A single violation of a safety agreement signed by both the respondent mother and father and the mother's lack of stable housing did not place the child at risk of harm. A court should look at the totality of the evidence when determining if the child is neglected.

A termination of parental rights based on neglect requires a finding about the probability of the repetition of neglect when the child has not been in the parent’s custody for a significant period of time before the TPR hearing. Without this finding the court may not terminate a parent’s rights on the ground of neglect set forth at G.S. 7B-1111(a)(1).

Pivotal findings of fact are not supported by the evidence, and the findings of fact do not support the conclusion of law that the respondent mother failed to make reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to the child’s removal. “While ‘extremely limited progress is not reasonable,’…certainly perfection is not required to reach the ‘reasonable’ standard.”

Under G.S. 7B-1103(a), a guardian has standing to initiate a TPR; a custodian does not. A custodian will only have standing if the child continuously resided with him or her for two years preceding the filing of the TPR petition. Because standing is jurisdictional, evidence must support the court's finding that the 2-year requirement was satisfied.

A temporary disposition order is not a final order that allows for an appeal of the adjudication and initial disposition under G.S. 7B-1001(a)(3) or an order changing legal custody of a juvenile under G.S. 7B-1001(a)(4).

G.S. 7B-101(1)d. includes in the definition of abuse, a juvenile whose parent who has permitted or encouraged the commission of certain sex crimes by, with, or upon the child. Both the older sibling that repeatedly sexually abused the younger sibling and the younger sibling were abused when the respondent parents were aware of the abuse and failed to take appropriate remedial measures to prevent it from recurring.

Testimonial statements are excluded by the Confrontation Clause. In determining if a statement is testimonial, a court will apply the “primary purpose test”: was the statement made with the primary purpose of being an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony. Here, a child’s statement to his teacher was not testimonial and its admission did not violate the Confrontation Clause. A mandated reporting law does not convert the primary purpose to one of obtaining evidence for criminal prosecution.

The rules of evidence apply at adjudicatory hearings; at dispositional hearings, the court relies on evidence that is relevant, reliable, and necessary to determine the most appropriate disposition for the child. Competent evidence supported a neglect adjudication. A court need not make findings regarding a parent's culpability when adjudicating neglect.

A child’s exposure to domestic violence may constitute an environment injurious to a child’s welfare resulting in an adjudication of neglect.

The court does not have authority to order a parent to participate in therapy in an adjudication order. G.S. 7B-904 authorizes a court to order a parent to participate in therapy in a dispositional or subsequent order. A TPR hearing 3 months after the dispositional order is entered is insufficient to determine if the children are at risk of repetition of neglect.

The court has discretion in deciding whether to hold a competency hearing to determine whether the parent requires a Rule 17 GAL. Substantial deference will be given to the trial court, who has interacted with and observed the respondent.

G.S. 7B-905.1 requires the court order include the minimum frequency and length of visits and whether the visits shall be supervised.

Cross-examination that demonstrated respondent's prior history with DSS was not objected to during trial and was not fundamentally unfair.

A court is required to verify and make an independent determination that the proposed guardian (1) understands the legal significance of the guardianship and (2) has adequate resources to care for the child.

It is reversible error if the court does not make findings of each of the enumerated factors in G.S. 7B-906.1(n) when waiving permanency planning hearings. Child had not resided in the placement for one year before the hearing waiving further reviews.

The court did not abuse its discretion when denying a continuance after findings the respondent's decision to start a new job the week of the TPR hearing was not extraordinary circumstances.