In re A.D.H., ___ N.C. App. ___ (September 3, 2024)
Held:
Vacated and Remanded
- Facts: This action involves simultaneous proceedings of a civil custody dispute between Mother and Father where DSS intervened and a juvenile action alleging the child at issue abused, neglected, and dependent. The child made statements to classmates and her school counselor that Father sexually abused her. A report was made to DSS resulting in an assessment that included the child’s interview at a child advocacy center and a child medical evaluation (CME). In the custody case, the trial court ultimately found that father did not sexually abuse his daughter and did not engage in any inappropriate activities with his daughter. The court entered a permanent child custody order (CCO) granting Father primary legal and physical custody because of concerns mother was coaching the child. The order also included a provision that no one but the child’s current therapist could discuss past sexual abuse allegations with the child. During its assessment, DSS filed an interference petition alleging that Father was refusing to allow the child to participate in a subsequent recommended CME. The trial court dismissed the interference petition (IPO) with prejudice after finding that (1) counsel for DSS stated the investigation could be completed without the CME and (2) reiterating facts in the CCO. The child made subsequent disclosures of Father’s sexual abuse. DSS filed a juvenile petition alleging the child abused, neglected, and dependent based on statements the child made both before and after entry of the CCO and IPO. Among various motions, Father filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim; a motion to dismiss pursuant to the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel; and a motion in limine to be allowed to examine the social worker. The trial court granted the motion in limine, and after Father examined the social worker, granted the 12(b)(6) and preclusion motions, and dismissed the petition. DSS appeals.
- Whether a trial court is barred by collateral estoppel is a question of law reviewed de novo. “Collateral estoppel will apply when: (1) a prior suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits; (2) identical issues were involved; (3) the issue was actually litigated in the prior suit and necessary to the judgment; and (4) the issue was actually determined.” Sl. Op. at 11 (citation omitted). “Collateral estoppel cannot apply to a proposition proven in a prior action when the subsequent action involves a higher standard of proof.” Sl. Op. at 13 (emphasis in original). “[W]here a party fails to establish a fact in a prior case under a lower burden of proof, collateral estoppel applies to preclude a subsequent finding that the same fact has been established under a higher standard of proof.” Sl. Op. at 16-17.
- The trial court did not err in determining factual issues alleged in the juvenile petition which were determined in the PPO and IPO were collaterally estopped. The standard of proof in a child custody case is preponderance of the evidence, while the standard of proof for an interference order or an abuse, neglect, or dependency adjudication order under G.S. 7B-805 is clear and convincing evidence - a higher standard than preponderance of the evidence. In this case, the findings in the PPO and IPO that allegations of Father’s sexual abuse made prior to those orders were unfounded prevent the juvenile court from making contrary findings of whether Father abused the child. In the CCO, allegations of Father’s sexual abuse were not proven under a preponderance of the evidence standard during the child custody proceedings and therefore cannot be proven under the higher standard required in the juvenile proceedings. In the IPO, allegations of Father’s sexual abuse of the child made prior to the order were not proven by clear and convincing evidence and therefore cannot be proven under the same standard in the juvenile proceeding.
- Though most of the factual issues in the juvenile petition were correctly ruled estopped, the trial court erred in dismissing the entire petition based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The juvenile petition alleges further instances of abuse taking place after entry of the CCO and IPO, supported by evidence after entry of those orders, which are not estopped from the CCO and IPO orders.
- A trial court’s ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo, without assessing the trial court’s reasoning, to determine if the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. “[G.S.] Chapter 7B specifically provides that a valid petition must include ‘allegations of facts sufficient to invoke jurisdiction over the juvenile[,]’ including allegations that the juvenile is abused, neglected, or dependent[,]” as defined under G.S. 7B-701(1), (15), and (9). Sl. Op. at 19, quoting G.S. 7B-402.
- The juvenile petition contained sufficient allegations to state a claim that the child was abused, neglected, and dependent despite the findings of abuse precluded by the CCO and IPO. The remaining factual allegations include Father’s more recent sexual abuse; a specific allegation of Father committing a criminal sex offense against the child that constitutes improper supervision and creating an injurious environment; and neither parent being appropriate caregivers due to allegations of Father’s sexual abuse and accusations of Mother coaching the child to accuse Father of sexual abuse, and no other caregivers being available. The trial court erred in granting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion because of allegations related to events that occurred after the CCO and IPO.
- The court of appeals vacated the order dismissing the petition and remanded the matter to the trial court to resolve all of Father’s unmooted and potentially relevant motions remaining and consider whether any allegations remain thereafter for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6).
Category:
Abuse, Neglect, DependencyStage:
Adjudicatory HearingTopic: