Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
Table of Contents
Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
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This compendium includes significant criminal cases by the U.S. Supreme Court & N.C. appellate courts, Nov. 2008 – Present. Selected 4th Circuit cases also are included.
Jessica Smith prepared case summaries Nov. 2008-June 4, 2019; later summaries are prepared by other School staff.
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In a per curiam decision in a case decided under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the Court held that no decision from the Court clearly establishes that a state court must impose a lower, originally expected sentence when—after the defendant has pled guilty—the State is allowed to amend the criminal complaint, subjecting the defendant to a higher sentence, and the defendant is allowed to withdraw his plea but chooses to enter into a new plea agreement based on the amended complaint. A California court permitted the State to amend a criminal complaint to which the defendant had pleaded guilty. That guilty plea would have led to a maximum sentence of 14 years, 4 months. The court acknowledged that permitting the amendment would lead to a higher sentence, and it consequently permitted the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. The defendant then pleaded guilty to the amended complaint and was sentenced to a term with a minimum of 25 years. The Ninth Circuit held that the defendant was entitled to specific performance of the lower 14-year, 4-month sentence that he would have received had the complaint not been amended. The Court reversed. It began by assuming that the State violated the Constitution when it moved to amend the complaint. But it went on to conclude: “we still are unable to find in Supreme Court precedent that clearly established federal law demanding specific performance as a remedy. To the contrary, no holdin[g] of this Court requires the remedy of specific performance under the circumstances present here.” (quotation omitted).
In this Guilford County case, defendant appealed the denial of his motions for appropriate relief (MARs), arguing error in summarily denying his MARs challenging the entry of his guilty plea. The Court of Appeals agreed, vacating the denials and remanding for an evidentiary hearing and findings of fact on defendant’s MARs.
In 2006, defendant was indicted for a robbery at a restaurant, and the charges included second-degree kidnapping and attempted kidnapping of two victims under sixteen years old. Defendant pleaded guilty to three charges and received an active sentence of imprisonment with nine months of post-release supervision; the trial court did not identify the offenses as reportable convictions. Afterwards, the Combined Records Section of North Carolina Department of Correction requested that the trial court clarify the ages of the kidnapping victims, and “[w]ithout prior notice nor Defendant being present, the trial court entered a ‘corrected’ judgment . . . indicating ‘the above designated offense(s) is a reportable conviction involving a minor. G.S. 14-208.6.’” Slip Op. at 2. This change required defendant to register as a sex offender and also required five years of post-release supervision. In defendant’s first MAR, he argued he did not learn of this change until right before his release from prison. The trial court denied defendant’s MARs without holding an evidentiary hearing.
Reviewing the MARs, the Court of Appeals highlighted that the issues before the trial court required settling factual disputes, and thus the trial court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing. The record before the court did not contain a verbatim recording of defendant’s entry of his guilty plea, limiting the court’s ability to consider defendant’s claims. This required the court to remand for an evidentiary hearing and to vacate the previous rulings on the MARs.
Going further, the court also considered whether the sex-offender registration and post-release supervision were direct or collateral consequences of defendant’s guilty plea, as failure to advise defendant of direct consequences would render his guilty plea involuntary. Regarding sex-offender registration, the court held that “sex offender registration is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea to a crime requiring registration.” Id. at 14. However, the court held that “post-release supervision is distinguishable from . . . sex offender registration” and represented a direct consequence of the guilty plea. Id. at 19. The court directed the trial court to consider defendant’s arguments regarding his post-release supervision to determine whether his plea was entered “voluntarily, intelligently and understandingly.” Id. at 21.
In this Wayne County case, defendant appealed his convictions for two counts of indecent liberties with a child, arguing error in finding that he was a recidivist. The Court of Appeals determined that defendant’s claims were meritless or procedurally barred and dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
Defendant entered into a plea agreement where he agreed to plead guilty based on allegations made against him in Duplin and Wayne Counties. In Duplin County, defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree statutory sexual offense in April 2020. In Wayne County, defendant pleaded guilty to the two indecent liberties charges giving rise to the current case in July 2023. When sentencing defendant in Wayne County, the trial court found that defendant qualified as a recidivist based on his prior Duplin County convictions and ordered him to register as a sex offender for life. Defendant filed a notice of appeal for the “Judicial Findings and Order for Sex Offenders” but did not appeal the underlying judgment. Subsequently, defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
The core of defendant’s argument was that the Duplin County charges for sexual offense were “joined in the same plea agreement” with the Wayne County charges for indecent liberties, and thus “should be treated in the same way as charges that are joined for trial.” Slip Op. at 3. Looking through applicable precedent, the court quickly dispensed with defendant’s argument, noting the cases cited by defendant were “readily distinguishable from the present case because the Duplin County charges and Wayne County charges were not joined for trial.” Id. at 5. The court explained that it was irrelevant that defendant entered a plea agreement for all the charges at the same time because defendant “was convicted and sentenced at different times for two separate sets of qualifying offenses.” Id. at 5-6. The court thus declined to grant the petition for lack of merit and dismissed defendant’s appeal.
The court also briefly considered defendant’s argument that his due process rights were infringed by the recidivist determination, explaining that defendant did not raise this argument in front of the trial court and that the court declined to invoke Rule of Appellate Procedure 2 to consider it.