Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
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Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
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This compendium includes significant criminal cases by the U.S. Supreme Court & N.C. appellate courts, Nov. 2008 – Present. Selected 4th Circuit cases also are included.
Jessica Smith prepared case summaries Nov. 2008-June 4, 2019; later summaries are prepared by other School staff.
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On appeal from a decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 802 S.E.2d 477 (2017), the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court properly excluded specific instances of the victim’s violent conduct for the purpose of proving that he was the first aggressor. The charges arose from the defendant’s shooting of the victim. The defendant asserted self-defense. In his case in chief, the defendant sought to introduce testimony describing specific instances of violent conduct by the victim, specifically testimony from three witnesses about times when they had experienced or witnessed the victim’s violent behavior. The trial court excluded this evidence but allowed each witness to testify to his or her opinion of the victim’s character for violence and the victim’s reputation in the community. Construing the relevant evidence rules, the Supreme Court determined that character is not an essential element of self-defense. Therefore, with regard to a claim of self-defense, the victim’s character may not be proved by evidence of specific acts. Here, the excluded evidence consisted of specific incidents of violence committed by the victim. Because Rule 405 limits the use of specific instances of past conduct to cases in which character is an essential element of the charge, claim, or defense, the trial court properly excluded testimony regarding these specific prior acts of violence by the victim.
In a murder and attempted armed robbery trial, the trial court erred when it excluded the defendant’s proposed testimony that he knew of certain violent acts by the victim and of the victim’s time in prison. This evidence was relevant to the defendant’s claim of self-defense to the murder charge and to his contention that he did not form the requisite intent for attempted armed robbery because “there is a greater disincentive to rob someone who has been to prison or committed violent acts.” The evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b) because it related to the defendant’s state of mind.
In this Durham County case, the defendant was found guilty by a jury of voluntary manslaughter. The charge arose out of the defendant’s shooting of Augustus Brandon, a long-time acquaintance that the defendant generally tried to avoid because of his perceived criminal and gang activity. In December 2016, the defendant was driving when he saw Brandon drive past him. Brandon turned his car around, followed the defendant, pulled in front of him, and then stopped his car in front of the defendant’s. When Brandon began approaching the defendant’s car, which had become stuck in a ditch, the defendant “just panicked” and fired his semi-automatic rifle three times, hitting Brandon once in the back and once in the back of the head, killing him. Mr. Brandon was unarmed. At trial, the jury was instructed on first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter. The jury returned a verdict of voluntary manslaughter.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion in limine regarding text messages and photographs on the victim’s cell phone. The State had asserted that the evidence—which pertained to the victim’s past violent acts and ownership and use of guns—would be more prejudicial than probative because specific acts of conduct are impermissible to prove a victim’s propensity for violence. The defendant argued that the State had opened the door to admission of the cell-phone evidence by introducing testimony about Brandon’s personality through his parents’ testimony, and that the evidence was admissible to impeach the victim’s father’s testimony that he did not previously know his son had possessed a gun.
The Court of Appeals concluded over a dissent that even if the cell-phone evidence was excluded in error, any error would not be sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial, because the defendant did not show a reasonable possibility that a different result would have been reached had the error not occurred. Other admissible evidence supported the defendant’s theory of self-defense, including the defendant’s own testimony about Brandon’s reputation for “gang bang[ing] and tot[ing] guns,” a previous incident in which Brandon showed the defendant a video of himself shooting a gun, and the fact that he was “terrified” at the time of the shooting. ¶ 23. Additionally, the evidence showed that even if the defendant was honestly in fear for his life, the degree of force he used was more than reasonably necessary—Brandon was unarmed and running away from the defendant when he was shot, and the defendant testified that he never saw Brandon holding a gun that day. In the absence of prejudicial error, the defendant’s conviction stood.
Judge Tyson dissented to say that he would have concluded that the State opened the door to the admission of the photos and texts from the victim’s phone when it introduced testimony from Brandon’s parents about his lack of guns and reputation for peacefulness and being a “happy guy.” The exclusion of that evidence, he argued, prejudiced the defendant’s right to present his defense by easing the State’s burden of proving that the defendant used unreasonable force.
In this murder case, the trial court did not err by excluding the defendant’s proffered evidence about the victim’s gang membership. The defendant asserted that the evidence was relevant to self-defense. However, none of the proffered evidence pertained to anything that the defendant actually knew at the time of the incident.
In murder case involving a claim of self-defense, the trial court did not err by excluding the defense expert testimony, characterized by the defendant as pertaining to the victim’s proclivity toward violence. The court noted that where self-defense is at issue, evidence of a victim’s violent or dangerous character may be admitted under Rule 404(a)(2) when such character was known to the accused or the State’s evidence is entirely circumstantial and the nature of the transaction is in doubt. The court concluded that the witness’s testimony did not constitute evidence of the victim’s character for violence. On voir dire, the witness testified only that that the victim was an angry person who had thoughts of violence; the witness admitted having no information that the victim actually had committed acts of violence. Additionally, the court noted, there was no indication that the defendant knew of the victim’s alleged violent nature and the State’s case was not entirely circumstantial. The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that the trial court’s ruling deprived him of a right to present a defense, noting that right is not absolute and defendants do not have a right to present evidence that the trial court, in its discretion, deems inadmissible under the evidence rules.
In this New Hanover County case, defendant appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury (AWDWIKISI), arguing error in (1) jury instructions regarding felony murder, (2) permitting the State to contend defendant committed robbery when he was previously acquitted, (3) improperly excluding evidence of the victim’s convictions and gang affiliations, and (4) not intervening in the State’s closing argument. The Court of Appeals found no error.
In February of 2015, defendant went to the apartment shared by the murder victim and his girlfriend to buy marijuana. An argument ensued, and both parties produced firearms. Testimony differed on what happened next, but defendant ended up shooting and killing the victim, and hitting the girlfriend with gunfire as well. Defendant went to trial in 2017 and was convicted of first-degree murder and AWDWIKISI, but acquitted of attempted robbery. Defendant appealed, and in State v. Greenfield, 375 N.C. 434 (2020), the Supreme Court granted defendant a new trial because the trial court did not provide instructions on self-defense and transferred intent. Defendant was retried in 2022 and again convicted, leading to the current case.
In (1), defendant argued that the jury instructions improperly allowed the jury to find him guilty of felony murder without the requisite intent, as the underlying felony was AWDWIKISI for the girlfriend, and defendant argued he was aiming for the murder victim and accidentally hit the girlfriend. The Court of Appeals explained that defendant’s argument rested on an interpretation of the “merger doctrine,” where the assault on a victim cannot be the underlying felony for felony murder of that victim. Here, the jury received instruction on transferred intent, where if defendant intended to harm one victim and instead harmed another, the legal effect would be the same. The court rejected defendant’s interpretation of the situation, explaining “this is not a case where the assault of a single victim resulted in the death of the same single victim.” Slip Op. at 14. Instead, the court found that the trial court’s instructions were correct and did not present the matter in a way that would mislead the jury.
For (2), defendant argued that allowing the State to introduce evidence and argument about the robbery charge represented double jeopardy; because defendant failed to preserve the majority of his objection, the court only considered whether it was error to allow the State to discuss the robbery in closing argument. The court looked to State v. Agee, 326 N.C. 542 (1990), as “both cases involve a continuous series of events that resulted in an acquittal for one charge at a prior trial,” explaining “[t]he State’s discussion of robbery was only used to explain the chain of events that led to the intentional shooting of [the murder victim and his girlfriend].” Slip Op. at 19-20. Based on applicable precedent, allowing this discussion was proper and “whether or not a robbery occurred, the evidence was without objection and tended to explain the chain of events leading to the shooting.” Id.
Reaching (3), the court parsed whether the exclusion of the murder victim’s prior convictions, gang affiliation, thug tattoo, and possession of assault rifles were properly excluded. Defendant argued this in two ways, first that the murder victim was the actual aggressor, and second that the evidence was admissible to rebut evidence of the victim’s peaceable character and gun habits. The court rejected both. First, the court noted these arguments had been rejected previously when defendant appealed his first conviction, but again noted that Rule of Evidence 403 and 405(b) did not support admission under these circumstances. The court then rejected defendant’s arguments about the gun habits and peaceable character, noting defendant was able to testify regarding some of the guns in the home, and the excluded evidence of firearms was not relevant. Regarding the peaceable character of defendant, the court explained that the evidence identified by defendant “does not go to [the victim’s] character for peacefulness and are not pertinent character traits as to whether the [victim] was violent.” Id. at 30. This led the court to conclude that “the testimony cited by Defendant does not open the door to rebuttal evidence of [the victim’s] character for violence.” Id. at 31.
Finally in (4), the court dispensed with defendant’s argument that a detective and prosecutors were permitted to give improper and prejudicial opinions on defendant’s credibility and guilt. The court looked for plain error as defendant did not object at trial. First the court looked at the detective’s testimony, where the detective testified he did not believe defendant acted in self-defense, and noted that the detective “was explaining why he brought that up in his interviews with Defendant” as it was a strategy to keep defendant talking and not a comment on the ultimate issue of self-defense in the case. Id. at 37. The court then looked at the statements made in closing argument, noting that the prosecutor did not explicitly call defendant a liar but instead highlighted the various stories he gave throughout the investigation about the events. The court found no issues justifying intervention ex mero motu and overruled defendant’s arguments.
The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder based on felony murder, attempted first-degree murder, felonious discharge of a firearm into an occupied vehicle in operation, and two counts of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. The defendant’s brother was the shooter and was convicted in a separate case. (1) On appeal the defendant argued that the trial judge committed plain error by admitting the following evidence. (A) A witness testified that the defendant knew that the defendant’s brother intended to shoot the victims. The Court found that the testimony was inadmissible because a witness may not testify to another person’s mind or purpose without personal knowledge of the person’s mind or purpose, a foundation not laid by the State. The Court concluded, however, that erroneous admission of the testimony did not have a probable impact on the jury’s finding that the defendant counseled and knowingly aided the shooting by assisting in luring the victims to the place where the defendant’s brother shot them. (B) Two witnesses who were not called as experts, one of whom was a detective, testified that the defendant concealed evidence about the planned shooting by using a smartphone texting app. Applying Rule 701 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, which requires that opinion testimony by lay witnesses be rationally based on a witness’s perception and helpful to the jury, the Court found that the State failed to lay a foundation showing that the witnesses were familiar with how the use of such apps affects cell phone records. The Court concluded that the erroneous admission of the testimony was not plain error because other evidence showed that the defendant was communicating with her brother via cellphone, that her brother destroyed his cellphone, and there were no records of their communications, which the jury could have viewed in a manner disadvantageous to the defendant. (C) A witness testified to the good character of one of the victims— that he was kind, protective, and nonviolent, among other qualities. The Court held that this testimony was inadmissible under Rule 404(a)(2) because it was not offered to rebut any evidence by the defendant that the victim was the first aggressor in the altercation. The Court concluded that the erroneous admission of the testimony was not plain error given other evidence consistent with the defendant’s guilt. (2) The defendant argued, the State conceded, and the Court found that the trial judge erred in allowing the jury to convict her of two counts of conspiracy because the evidence showed a single conspiracy to shoot two people. The Court therefore vacated one of the conspiracy convictions and remanded for resentencing. One judge concurred in the result only.
The trial judge erred under Rule 404(a)(2) in allowing the state to offer evidence of the victim’s good character. The court concluded that the defense had not offered evidence of the victim’s bad character, even though defense counsel had forecast evidence of the victim’s bad character in an opening statement.