State v. Spry, COA24-129, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Feb. 5, 2025)

In this Guilford County case, defendant appealed the denial of his motions for appropriate relief (MARs), arguing error in summarily denying his MARs challenging the entry of his guilty plea. The Court of Appeals agreed, vacating the denials and remanding for an evidentiary hearing and findings of fact on defendant’s MARs.

In 2006, defendant was indicted for a robbery at a restaurant, and the charges included second-degree kidnapping and attempted kidnapping of two victims under sixteen years old. Defendant pleaded guilty to three charges and received an active sentence of imprisonment with nine months of post-release supervision; the trial court did not identify the offenses as reportable convictions. Afterwards, the Combined Records Section of North Carolina Department of Correction requested that the trial court clarify the ages of the kidnapping victims, and “[w]ithout prior notice nor Defendant being present, the trial court entered a ‘corrected’ judgment . . . indicating ‘the above designated offense(s) is a reportable conviction involving a minor.  G.S. 14-208.6.’” Slip Op. at 2. This change required defendant to register as a sex offender and also required five years of post-release supervision. In defendant’s first MAR, he argued he did not learn of this change until right before his release from prison. The trial court denied defendant’s MARs without holding an evidentiary hearing.

Reviewing the MARs, the Court of Appeals highlighted that the issues before the trial court required settling factual disputes, and thus the trial court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing. The record before the court did not contain a verbatim recording of defendant’s entry of his guilty plea, limiting the court’s ability to consider defendant’s claims. This required the court to remand for an evidentiary hearing and to vacate the previous rulings on the MARs.

Going further, the court also considered whether the sex-offender registration and post-release supervision were direct or collateral consequences of defendant’s guilty plea, as failure to advise defendant of direct consequences would render his guilty plea involuntary. Regarding sex-offender registration, the court held that “sex offender registration is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea to a crime requiring registration.” Id. at 14. However, the court held that “post-release supervision is distinguishable from . . . sex offender registration” and represented a direct consequence of the guilty plea. Id. at 19. The court directed the trial court to consider defendant’s arguments regarding his post-release supervision to determine whether his plea was entered “voluntarily, intelligently and understandingly.” Id. at 21.