In this Wake County case, defendant appealed his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, arguing error in failing to instruct the jury on the Castle Doctrine in G.S. 14-51.2. The Court of Appeals agreed that defendant was entitled to a Castle Doctrine instruction, reversing the conviction and remanding for a new trial.

In the summer of 2020, defendant met a woman on Facebook and they agreed to set up a time to meet. On the agreed day, the couple spent time driving around, and returned to the street outside the woman’s house. At that point, a man who previously had a relationship with the woman showed up, yelling at defendant. This led to defendant leaving his car, a physical altercation, and ultimately defendant shooting the man in the street and fleeing in his vehicle. In February of 2023, defendant went on trial for murder. During the trial, the State called the woman and another witness who was present at the time, and both testified about the events leading to the shooting. Defendant also testified about the events and why he felt it was necessary to shoot the victim. At the charge conference, the trial court denied defendant’s request for a Castle Doctrine instruction under G.S. 14-51.2, as defendant was not an “occupant” in his motor vehicle when the shooting occurred. Slip Op. at 7. The trial court ultimately gave an instruction on self-defense, but included the instruction that if defendant used excessive force in self-defense, he would be guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Defendant was subsequently convicted of voluntary manslaughter, and appealed.

The Court of Appeals first explained the difference between common law self-defense and the Castle Doctrine, as the latter provides a defendant “the presumption of justified deadly force,” which is rebuttable in certain circumstances. Id. at 14-15. Here, there were two issues regarding defendant’s right to an instruction on the doctrine; first, whether defendant was an “occupant” of a motor vehicle when using force, and second, whether (i) the victim was unlawfully entering or entered the vehicle and (ii) defendant knew or had reason to believe the unlawful entry was occurring or occurred. Id. at 15. The first issue required the court to interpret the language of G.S. 14-51.2, as the term is undefined in the statute. Because the plain language also did not offer a clear answer, the court looked to “the language, object, and spirit of the statutory castle doctrine.” Id. at 20. After this analysis, the court noted the use of the word “of” and not “within,” and arrived at the following interpretation:

[T]he lawful occupant “of” a home, motor vehicle, or workplace is not bound to become a fugitive from these locations, and therefore is not required to flee or remain in his home, motor vehicle, or workplace until his assailant is upon him. Rather, the lawful occupant, under specific circumstances— including those where he is no longer within the home, motor vehicle, or workplace— may exercise deadly defensive force against his assailant.

Id. at 24 (cleaned up). Applying this interpretation to the current case, “where Defendant retreated from his vehicle amidst an enduring attack, and exercised deadly force while standing directly next to the driver’s side door, and still under attack,” the court held that defendant was an “occupant” for purposes of the statute. Id. at 27.

The court then looked to determine if the victim unlawfully entered the vehicle, and if defendant had the required knowledge of that entry. The court found both of these in the record, as “the Record demonstrates that [the victim], without Defendant’s invitation or consent, opened the passenger’s side door of Defendant’s car and began attacking Defendant, and after Defendant exited his vehicle, [the victim] came around the vehicle and continued to attack Defendant.” Id. at 29. Because defendant was an “occupant” of the vehicle and the victim unlawfully entered the vehicle, defendant was entitled to the Castle Doctrine instruction. The court held the lack of a Castle Doctrine instruction was prejudicial, explaining “because Defendant has shown by competent evidence he was entitled to a statutory castle doctrine instruction, but for the trial court’s instructional error, there is a reasonable possibility a different result would have been reached by the jury.” Id. at 31.

Judge Stroud concurred in the result only and wrote separately to express that the majority engaged in unnecessary statutory interpretation to justify that defendant was an “occupant” under the statute. 

In this case where the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. On appeal, the defendant argued that he acted in the heat of passion. The defendant did not testify at trial, nor did any witness testify on his behalf. The State’s evidence indicated that the defendant was the initial aggressor and that he was the only one to make any threats or perform any violent acts. The court determined that there “simply [was] no evidence” to support heat of passion.

In this assault and second-degree murder case, the trial court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense and by omitting an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. The court noted that the defendant himself testified that when he fired the gun he did not intend to shoot anyone and that he was only firing warning shots. It noted: “our Supreme Court has held that a defendant is not entitled to jury instructions on self-defense or voluntary manslaughter ‘while still insisting . . . that he did not intend to shoot anyone[.]’”