Smith's Criminal Case Compendium

Smith's Criminal Case Compendium

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This compendium includes significant criminal cases by the U.S. Supreme Court & N.C. appellate courts, Nov. 2008 – Present. Selected 4th Circuit cases also are included.

Jessica Smith prepared case summaries Nov. 2008-June 4, 2019; later summaries are prepared by other School staff.

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E.g., 04/06/2025
E.g., 04/06/2025

In this Wake County case, defendant appealed after pleading guilty to felony death by vehicle, felony serious injury by vehicle, and driving while impaired, challenging the sentencing he received for his convictions. The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded for resentencing.

In January of 2022, defendant caused a head-on collision that killed two passengers in the other vehicle and injured several more. Officers found used nitrous oxide containers in the vehicle, and defendant admitted to also using alcohol and marijuana the evening of the collision. Defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to an agreement that avoided second-degree murder; the State stipulated to a mitigating factor that defendant “has accepted responsibility for [his] criminal conduct.” Slip Op. at 3. Defendant waived his right to appeal in the plea agreement. However, along with his appeal in this case, defendant filed a writ of certiorari, which the Court of Appeals granted to consider this case. The State did not oppose defendant’s writ and conceded that an error was committed. 

Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court failed to consider his mitigating factor that he and the State stipulated to in the plea agreement. The Court of Appeals agreed, quoting State v. Albert, 312 N.C. 567, 579 (1985), for the proposition that “when the State stipulates to the facts supporting the finding of a mitigating factor, ‘the trial court err[s] in failing to find this fact in mitigation.’” Slip Op. at 7. Defendant also argued he was entitled to a different trial judge on remand. The court disagreed on that point, noting that the trial judge was not exposed to any prejudicial information beyond the plea agreement, and defendant could not demonstrate a risk to his bargained-for agreement if the case was remanded to the same judge. Thus the court vacated and remanded to the trial court for resentencing.

In this Cabarrus County case, defendant appealed judgment entered on his guilty plea, arguing that the trial court refused to allow him to withdraw his plea after imposing a sentence differing from the plea agreement. The Court of Appeals agreed, vacating the judgment and remanding for further proceedings. 

In August of 2022, defendant entered a plea agreement for felony fleeing to elude arrest. The agreement specified that defendant would receive a suspended sentence in the presumptive range. However, at defendant’s plea hearing, the trial court imposed an additional “split sentence of 30 days” in jail as a special condition of probation. Slip Op. at 2. Defense counsel moved to strike the plea, but the trial court denied the motion. 

After reviewing the applicable caselaw and statutes, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by failing to strictly adhere to the terms of the plea agreement. Based upon the transcript, it appeared that the trial court felt the addition was permitted because the plea agreement did not mention special conditions related to probation. The court explained: 

Our courts have held that strict adherence to plea arrangements means giving the defendant what they bargained for. . . [t]o the extent the terms of the arrangement—including whether the parties had agreed to the imposition of a special condition of probation—were unclear, the trial court should have sought clarification from the parties rather than impose a sentence it decided was appropriate.

Id. at 6-7.

The trial court erred by imposing a sentence inconsistent with that set out in his plea agreement without informing the defendant that he had a right to withdraw his guilty plea. The defendant was charged with multiple counts involving multiple victims and occurring between 1998 and 2015. On the third day of trial, he negotiated a plea agreement with the State, whereby he would plead guilty to a number of offenses and would receive a single, consolidated active sentence of 290 to 408 months imprisonment. Over the next weeks and prior to sentencing, the defendant wrote to the trial court asserting his innocence to some of the charges and suggesting his desire to withdraw from the plea agreement. The trial court acknowledged receipt of the letters and forwarded them to defense counsel. When the defendant later appeared for sentencing, he formally moved to withdraw his guilty plea, which was denied. Contrary to the plea agreement, the trial court entered two judgments, one for the 2015 offenses and one for the 1998 offenses, based on the different sentencing grids that applied to the crimes. Specifically, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 290 to 408 months for the 2015 offenses, and for the 1998 offenses a separate judgment sentencing the defendant to 288 to 355 months imprisonment. The trial court ordered that the sentences would run concurrently. The defendant appealed. Because the concurrent sentences imposed by the trial court differed from the single sentence agreed to by the defendant in his plea agreement, the defendant was entitled to withdraw his plea. Any change by the trial judge in the sentence agreed to in the plea agreement, even a change benefiting the defendant, requires the judge to give the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea.

As conceded by the State, the trial court erred by resentencing the defendant to a sentence greater than that provided for in his plea agreement without giving the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea, as required by G.S. 15A-1024.

The trial court did not violate G.S. 15A-1024 (withdrawal of guilty plea when sentence not in accord with plea arrangement) by sentencing the defendant in the presumptive range. Under G.S. 15A-1024, if the trial court decides to impose a sentence other than that provided in a plea agreement, the court must inform the defendant of its decision and that he or she may withdraw the plea; if the defendant chooses to withdraw, the court must grant a continuance until the next court session. Although the defendant characterized the agreement as requiring sentencing in the mitigated range, the court found that his interpretation was not supported by the plain language of the plea arrangement, which stated only that the State “shall not object to punishment in the mitigated range.”

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