State v. Vaughn, COA23-337, ___ N.C. App. ___ (May. 7, 2024)

In this Lincoln County case, defendant appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and possessing a weapon of mass death and destruction, arguing error in denying his requested jury instructions on stand-your-ground and defense of habitation for murder and justification for the possession of a weapon of mass death charge. The Court of Appeals found error in denying the stand-your-ground instruction, but no error in denying the other two. The court vacated the first-degree murder charge and remanded for a new trial and resentencing.

In August of 2017, defendant became involved in a dispute with the owner of his residence and her son. After an extended argument, defendant retrieved a sawed-off shotgun from the residence. At that point, after further arguing, the landlord’s son charged defendant and defendant shot him in the chest, killing him.  

Considering defendant’s arguments, the Court of Appeals explained that the recent decision in State v. McLymore, 380 N.C. 185 (2022), altered the analysis of whether defendant could claim stand-your-ground as a defense under G.S. 14-51.3. Previously, under State v. Crump, 259 N.C. App. 144 (2018), a defendant was disqualified from using force in self defense if they were committing a felony, and the State did not have to prove a connection between the felony and the use of force in self-defense. The Supreme Court held in McLymore that “the State must prove the existence of an immediate causal nexus between the defendant’s disqualifying conduct and the confrontation during which the defendant used force.” Slip Op at 9, quoting McLymore at 197-98.  

In this case, Crump controlled when the trial was held, as McLymore had not been released. After considering the evidence at trial, the court concluded:

[T]here is a reasonable possibility that, had the trial court instructed the jury on the stand-your-ground provision and causal nexus requirement, the jury would have determined that Defendant’s use of deadly force was justified because he reasonably believed that such force was necessary to prevent imminent death to himself and that there was no causal nexus between Defendant’s felonious possession of a weapon of mass death and destruction and his use of force.

Slip Op. at 13. Although the same logic regarding disqualification applied to the requested instruction on defense of habitation, the court found that failing to give this instruction was not error, as the victim was not “in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering or had unlawfully and forcibly entered [defendant’s] home, including the curtilage of the home.” Id. at 15. Instead, the victim and defendant had spent time together sitting in the living room just a few hours before the shooting and went for a ride together in a car just before the shooting, ending with the parties coming back to park in front of defendant’s trailer. The victim’s mother was the landlord, who was also present at the scene. 

The court also dispensed with the defense of justification instruction, noting that defendant did not provide evidence in the record to support the elements of that claim. 

Judge Zachary concurred by separate opinion to comment on the use of defense of habitation.