Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
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State v. Parker, COA24-230, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Mar. 19, 2025)
In this Wilson County case, defendant appealed his convictions for second-degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon, arguing error in (1) failing to intervene ex mero motu during the State’s closing argument or in the alternative ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object, and (2) sentencing him to a Class B1 sentence with lack of support. The Court of Appeals found no error.
The murder victim had previously attacked defendant’s son, and defendant came to the house were the victim lived with his mother in May of 2020 seeking retribution. Defendant and an accomplice forced their way into the home and after a confrontation, defendant shot the victim. The accomplice pleaded guilty to manslaughter and testified for the State. During closing arguments, the State referenced defendant’s plea of not guilty, criticized the manner in which defense counsel had cross-examined the victim’s mother, and equated his trial to the charges the accomplice-turned-witness had pled guilty to.
Taking up (1), the Court of Appeals first established that the statements in question occurred after defendant had attacked the validity of the victim’s mother’s testimony in closing arguments, and “[t]he State’s closing arguments were not prejudicial comments on Defendant’s execution of his right to remain silent, but could be considered instead a defense of the State’s strategy.” Slip Op. at 8. When considering the statement regarding the manslaughter plea of the witness, the court explained that while it is possible there was a misstatement of the law, “the trial court also provided the jury with instructions regarding how to evaluate the testimony of a witness who had secured a plea deal from the State.” Id. at 9. Finally, the court found no prejudice from any possible ineffective assistance of counsel, as the State provided overwhelming evidence that defendant was the shooter.
Moving to (2), the court explained that B1 and B2 felonies are “differentiated by the type of malice involved,” with B1 felonies being the default for second-degree murder and B2 felonies being justified by inherently dangerous acts or omissions only. Here, the State did not argue or present evidence defendant acted recklessly or engaged in an inherently dangerous act, and instead “[t]he State presented substantial evidence tending to show Defendant was in unlawful possession of a deadly weapon and was intent on causing harm and revenge.” Id. at 14. Thus, defendant’s sentence was justified by the evidence.