State v. Boyd, COA 24-36, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Feb. 5, 2025)

In this Pasquotank County case, defendant appealed his convictions for first-degree murder, possession of a firearm by a felon, and interfering with an electronic monitoring device, arguing error in (1) violation of his right to a speedy trial, (2) failure to inquire or replace a juror who fell asleep, and (3) giving clarification of jury instructions. The Court of Appeals remanded for consideration of the relevant factors in (1), but found no error with (2)-(3). 

 

In October of 2020, the victim was found shot to death in a parked vehicle at an Elizabeth City apartment complex. Witnesses observed the victim and another man, later identified as defendant, arguing in the parking lot before the shooting. Defendant was arrested in New York in November 2020 and was held until his trial in March of 2023. During this time, defendant filed two motions for speedy trial and a motion to dismiss for violation of his speedy trial rights, all of which the trial court denied. During the trial, one juror was observed closing her eyes and apparently sleeping, but the trial court denied the request to replace the juror with an alternate. During jury deliberations, the jurors sent a request for clarification of the difference between first- and second-degree murder, and the trial court provided an explanation involving “premeditation and deliberation.” Slip Op. at 7. Defense counsel argued that this instruction left out “intent to kill” but the trial court declined to further instruct the jury. Id. 

 

Taking up (1), the Court of Appeals looked to Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), and North Carolina precedent adopting the Barker factors for speedy trial violations, noting that “when a delay approaches a year, it is enough to cause concern that the delay may be unreasonable and to trigger examination of all four Barker factors.” Id. at 11. In the current case, the trial court held a hearing in November of 2022 on the motion to dismiss, but the trial court did not reduce its findings to a written order or articulate findings under the Barker factors. Because the trial court’s oral statements did not show conclusions on “the issue of presumptive prejudice” or “whether the trial court ever considered any of the Barker factors,” the court remanded for a determination with findings of fact and conclusions of law. Slip Op. at 13. 

 

Considering (2), the court explained that “[t]he trial court sits in the best position to evaluate the significance of the allegation against the juror” and here, the trial court “acted within its discretion in declining to conduct further inquiry.” Id. at 15. The court found no error in declining to investigate further in the current case. 

 

Reaching (3), the court noted that “[t]he trial court omitted . . . the intent to kill requirement when giving the final mandate, a summary of the charge, to the jury before sending them back to deliberations.” Id. at 16. Applying the plain error standard, the court found no error, as the instruction was “incomplete” but not contradictory, and significant evidence showed defendant’s guilt. Id. at 18.