Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
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State v. Bell, 86A02-2, ___ N.C. ___ (Mar. 21, 2025)
In this Onslow County case, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review defendant’s post-conviction motion for appropriate relief (MAR), and an amendment to the MAR, after receiving a sentence of death for first-degree murder. The Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment denying defendant’s MAR, concluding that defendant’s claim of gender-based discrimination in jury selection was not preserved for review and barred by G.S. 15A-1419. Defendant’s co-defendant for this murder also appealed, and the Supreme Court considered that appeal in State v. Sims, 297PA18, issued contemporaneously with this opinion.
In January of 2000, defendant and a co-defendant kidnapped and killed an eighty-nine-year-old woman. In 2001 defendant was tried for murder, receiving the death penalty. The Supreme Court upheld this conviction on defendant’s appeal. Subsequently defendant filed his initial MAR, which he then amended in 2012 by arguing unconstitutional gender-based discrimination at his trial based on the affidavit of one of the State’s prosecutors at defendant’s trial. This affidavit referenced a specific female juror who was struck on the basis of her gender, as the prosecution was attempting to get more male jurors on the panel. The superior court determined that defendant was in a position to raise the gender-based discrimination claim on direct appeal and his MAR claim was barred. After this, an evidentiary hearing was held in 2022, and the superior court reviewing the MAR of defendant and his co-defendant found gender-based discrimination under J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). The procedural history and findings of the superior court are detailed in pages 6-14 of the slip opinion.
Taking up defendant’s petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court first reviewed whether defendant had preserved his claim “that the prosecutor impermissibly struck a juror on the basis of gender.” Slip Op. at 16. The Court concluded defendant failed to preserve his claim, as constitutional issues not raised on direct appeal are waived, and even if defendant preserved his J.E.B. claim, it was procedurally barred under G.S. 15A-1419. Defendant argued that he was not able to raise his discrimination claim on direct appeal because he was not yet in possession of the prosecutor’s affidavit, meaning he did not have sufficient evidence to adequately raise the claim at that time. The Court rejected this argument, as “[t]he jury selection transcript reveals pointed statements baldly communicated by the State—in open court—that it wanted to place more men on the jury at the expense of seating women.” Id. at 20. Additionally, the Court noted “the transcripts and questionnaires provide the basis for a statistical analysis of the State’s use of peremptory strikes based on gender.” Id. at 22. Essentially, the Court held that the evidence of discrimination was obvious from the proceedings and defendant could have performed the statistical analysis supporting the discrimination claim without the prosecutor’s affidavit; defendant’s own statistical expert performed the analysis during the MAR evidentiary hearing with this information.
The Court also rejected defendant’s argument that the later discovery of the prosecutor’s affidavit represented good cause under G.S. 15A-1419(c) to overcome the mandatory procedural bar. As noted above, the Court did not agree that the prosecutor’s affidavit was essential to raising the claim, as “[i]t is evident from the cold record that the remarks made by the State during voir dire put defendant on notice that he needed to raise a J.E.B. objection.” Id. at 27. While acknowledging that the discriminatory behavior in this matter was reprehensible, the Court held that statutory and procedural requirements barred consideration of defendant’s claim as he did not raise it on direct appeal.
Justice Earls, joined by Justice Riggs, concurred in the result only, writing separately to note that precedent constrained the possible methods of post-conviction relief in situations like the current case. Id. at 31.