State v. Daw, 174PA21, ___ N.C. ___ (Aug. 23, 2024)

In this Wake County case, the Supreme Court modified and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision affirming the denial of defendant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. Defendant argued that he was unlawfully and illegally detained because the Department of Public Safety could not ensure he was not exposed to COVID-19. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial, but modified the Court of Appeals decision as it was error to consider portions of G.S. Chapter 17 beyond G.S. 17-4.

Defendant pleaded guilty to multiple counts of obtaining property by false pretenses in 2019, and was imprisoned when the COVID-19 pandemic began. Defendant applied for a writ of habeas corpus in Wake County Superior Court, arguing “the potential viral spread of COVID-19 within the correctional institution, combined with petitioner’s medical history and condition, rendered his continued confinement cruel and/or unusual.” Slip Op. at 2. The trial court denied defendant’s application under G.S. 17-4(2), as defendant had a valid final judgment in a criminal case entered by a court with proper jurisdiction. Defendant then petitioned the Court of Appeals, who allowed his petition and issued a decision affirming the denial, but repudiating the trial court’s basis for its decision. The Court of Appeals pointed to G.S. 17-33(2) as an exception to G.S. 17-4(2), although defendant’s claim did not represent a violation of his rights. Although defendant’s application was never granted, he was released in February 2021 under the Extended Limits of Confinement Program, prior to the issuance of the Court of Appeals decision. The Court of Appeals acknowledged defendant’s issue was moot in its decision. The State petitioned the Supreme Court for discretionary review of this Court of Appeals decision, leading to the current case. 

The Supreme Court first confirmed that mootness did not prevent its review of the Court of Appeals decision as the public interest exception applied. Then the Court offered an overview of the history related to writs of habeas corpus and explained how the current provisions of G.S. Chapter 17 govern applications for the writ. For applications, G.S. 17-4 provides “a general rule and an exception; application of the writ is available to any person restrained of their liberty regardless of whether such restraint resulted from a criminal or civil matter, unless the restraint stems from those instances specified in section 17-4.” Id. at 10. 

Relevant for the current case, “the writ of habeas corpus is expressly not available in this State to persons ‘detained by virtue of the final order, judgment or decree of a competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction.’” Id. at 12. Because defendant did not assert a jurisdictional defect, defendant’s application was properly denied by the trial court under G.S. 17-4(2), and the Court of Appeals’ reference to G.S. 17-33 was erroneous. The Court pointed out that G.S. 17-33 was “inapplicable in this matter” as that provision applies to those “in custody by virtue of civil process,” as opposed to defendant, who was imprisoned after a final judgment. Id. at 14. Additionally, the Court took pains to clarify that the two provisions could not conflict due to the operation of G.S. Chapter 17. Id. at 18.

Justice Earls dissented and provided a lengthy discussion disagreeing with the majority’s invocation of the public interest exception to mootness, and disagreement with the majority’s interpretation of the provisions in G.S. Chapter 17. Id. at 21. 

Justice Riggs dissented and agreed with Justice Earls’ analysis of the mootness issue but wrote separately to emphasize her disagreement with the majority’s invocation of the public interest exception. Id. at 61.