In re A.J.L.H., _ N.C. _ (June 28, 2024)

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Held:

Reversed

Facts and procedural history: This action involves three children that share the same mother and separate fathers. DSS filed a petition based on mother and (step)father’s repeated use of corporal punishment that caused bruising and marks on the oldest child as well as a requirement to stand in the corner for hours at a time and to sleep on the floor. The parents admitted to their repeated use of this punishment and did not believe their disciplinary methods were cruel or unusual. The oldest child was adjudicated abused and neglected and the two younger siblings were adjudicated neglected. At initial disposition only the biological father of one of the younger children was granted visitation. The trial court determined that visitation with Mother, (step)father, and the third biological father was not in the children’s best interests while respondents were working on their case plans with DSS. The parents appealed, challenging the adjudications and denial of visitation. The court of appeals vacated and remanded the adjudication of neglect for the oldest juvenile, ordered the trial court to dismiss the adjudications of the siblings, and ordered on remand that if the older juvenile was adjudicated the trial court order general and increasing visitation with the mother. In re A.J.L.H., 275 N.C. App. 11 (2020). The supreme court allowed discretionary review and reversed the court of appeals decision, thereby affirming the adjudication orders as to the three juveniles, and held the court of appeals instruction to the trial court regarding disposition improper. In re A.J.L.H., 384 N.C. 45 (2023). On remand from the supreme court to address the respondents’ remaining arguments regarding the disposition order, the court of appeals vacated the dispositional portions of the order and remanded to the trial court to make the “required findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning visitation, family placement, and parental involvement in medical treatment in the best interests of each child for each respective parent of each child.” In re A.J.L.H., 289 N.C. App. 644, 652 (2023) (emphasis in original). DSS and GAL petitioned the supreme court for discretionary review, amended to seek review as to the oldest child only, arguing the court of appeals erred in its review of the dispositional order by: (1) misstating the standard of proof required for dispositional findings; (2) using the wrong standard to review dispositional evidence; (3) requiring the trial court to find that the parents acted inconsistently with their constitutionally protected status in order to deny visitation (4) abrogating G.S. 7B-905.1 and creating a new constitutional rights analysis; (5) determining there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact; and (6) reversing the trial court based on holding the trial court erred as to findings of fact related to non-appealing parties. Mother is the only respondent to this appeal.
“[Appellate courts] review the trial court’s dispositional findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by competent evidence. The trial court’s assessment of a juvenile’s best interests at the dispositional stage is reviewed solely for abuse of discretion.” Sl. Op. at 7 (citation omitted). Appellate courts “ ‘defer to the trial court’s decision unless it is manifestly unsupported by reason or one so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision[,]’ ” whereby “the remedy is to vacate the disposition order but to ‘express no opinion as to the ultimate result . . .’ ” Sl. Op. at 11 (citations omitted). G.S. 7B-901(a) authorizes trial courts to consider “any evidence . . . that the court finds to be relevant, reliable, and necessary to determine the needs of the juvenile and the most appropriate disposition.” Sl. Op. at 8-9, quoting G.S. 7B-901(a). “[A] trial court’s ‘decisions as to the weight and credibility of the evidence, and inferences drawn from the evidence, are not subject to appellate review.’ ” Sl. Op. at 11 (citation omitted). The court of appeals erred in stating that, “Dispositional findings must be based on properly admitted and clear cogent and convincing evidence.” Sl. Op. at 8, quoting In re A.J.L.H., 289 N.C. App. at 650.
An order removing custody from a parent or custodian or continuing placement outside of the home must “provide for visitation that is in the best interests of the juvenile consistent with the juvenile’s health and safety, including no visitation.” Sl. Op. at 10 (emphasis added in original), quoting G.S. 7B-905.1(a). The court of appeals erred in requiring the trial court to make findings of each parent’s fitness or conduct inconsistent with their parental rights before making a best interests determination regarding visitation, as this “two-step analysis” is not required under G.S. 7B-905.1. Sl. Op. at 9. Further, in its first opinion affirming the adjudication orders, the supreme court directed the court of appeals not to address the constitutional status of the parents on remand as the issue was not raised to the trial court nor briefed on appeal.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Unchallenged findings of fact support the trial court’s dispositional order denying visitation, including that Mother has extensive CPS history involving inappropriate discipline and abuse of the children, to which she admitted, defended, and asserted plans to continue. Mother failed to understand that the discipline of the oldest child was inappropriate and subjected the child to trauma. Permissible dispositional evidence under G.S. 7B-901(a) also included a letter to the court from the older child stating her wishes to stay with her grandmother and not visit with mother due to mother and stepfather’s past abuse.
The court of appeals erred in holding that the trial court must find and make conclusions addressing the factors applicable to visitation for each child with each parent. Two of the biological fathers were not parties to the appeal and “[t]here is no precedent which allows the [c]ourt of [a]ppeals to assert an appeal on behalf of a non-appealing party.” Sl. Op. at 13. The court of appeals erred in holding that the trial court must make findings differentiating visitation ordered between the parties. No statute or caselaw requires these findings.