

805.71 DUTY OF LANDLORD TO RESIDENTIAL TENANT—RESIDENTIAL
PREMISES AND COMMON AREAS.

*NOTE WELL: Use this instruction only where
the Residential Rental Agreement Act, N.C.G.S. §§ 42-
38, et seq., applies.*

This issue reads:

“Was the plaintiff [injured] [damaged] by the negligence of the
defendant?”

On this issue the burden of proof is on the plaintiff. This means
that the plaintiff must prove, by the greater weight of the evidence, that
the defendant was negligent and that such negligence was a proximate
cause of the plaintiff's [injury] [damage].

The Residential Rental Agreement Act imposes upon landlords a
duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain their residential properties in a
safe condition.¹ A violation of this duty is negligence.

In order to prevail on this issue, the plaintiff must prove, by the
greater weight of the evidence, the following five things:

First, the plaintiff was a tenant under a rental agreement for a
dwelling unit leased from the defendant.

Second, that an unsafe condition existed on the premises. [This
includes not only the dwelling unit itself, but the amenities and common
areas under the landlord's control and made available for the tenant's
use.]²

Third, that the defendant knew or, in the exercise of ordinary care,
should have known of the existence of the unsafe condition. Landlords
have a duty to make a reasonable inspection of their residential premises
and are responsible for knowing what a reasonable inspection would
reveal.³

Fourth, that the defendant failed to exercise ordinary care to remove or remedy the unsafe condition.⁴ Landlords are required by law to

[comply with the current applicable building and housing codes to the extent required by such codes (*Read applicable code provisions*)]⁵

[make all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition]⁶

[keep all common areas of the premises in a safe condition]⁷

[maintain in good and safe working order all [electrical] [plumbing] [sanitary] [heating] [ventilating] [air conditioning] [appliances] [(*name other facility*)] supplied by or required to be supplied by the landlord, provided that notification of needed repairs has been given to the landlord in writing by the tenant, except in emergency situations].⁸

A landlord's failure to comply with [this requirement] [any of these requirements] may be considered by you as evidence of the landlord's failure to use ordinary care to maintain the leased premises in a safe condition.⁹

Fifth, that such failure was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's [injury] [damage]. Proximate cause is a real cause- a cause without which the claimed [injury] [damage] would not have occurred, and one which a reasonably careful and prudent person could foresee would probably produce such [injury] [damage] or some similar injurious result. There may be more than one proximate cause of [an injury] [damage]. Therefore, the plaintiff need not prove that the defendant's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the [injury] [damage]. The plaintiff must prove, by the greater weight of the evidence, only that the defendant's negligence was a proximate cause.

In this case, the plaintiff contends, and the defendant denies, that the defendant was negligent in one or more of the following respects:

(Read all contentions of negligence supported by the evidence.)

The plaintiff further contends, and the defendant denies, that defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff's [injury] [damage].

I instruct you that negligence is not to be presumed from the mere fact of [injury] [damage].

Finally, as to this issue on which the plaintiff has the burden of proof, if you find, by the greater weight of the evidence, that the defendant was negligent and that such negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff's [injury] [damage] then it would be your duty to answer this issue "Yes" in favor of the plaintiff.

If, on the other hand, you fail to so find, then it would be your duty to answer this issue "No" in favor of the defendant.

1. *Bradley v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.*, 90 N.C. App. 581, 584 (1988); *Lenz v. Ridgewood Associates*, 55 N.C. App. 115, 117 (1981), *disc. rev. denied* 305 N.C. 300 (1982).

2. N.C.G.S. § 42-40(2).

3. The duty to keep the premises in a safe condition "implies the duty to make reasonable inspection and correct an unsafe condition which a reasonable inspection might reveal..." *Lenz v. Ridgewood Associates*, 55 N.C. App. 115, 121 (1981) *disc. rev. denied*, 305 N.C. 300 (1982).

4. This affirmative duty owed by the landlord to the tenant is not a duty to warn of unfit conditions but to correct unfit conditions. *Brooks v. Francis*, 57 N.C. App. 556, 559 (1982). Similarly, the landlord owes the duty of ordinary care to the tenant. Because the landlord owes the tenant the duty of ordinary care he is not, therefore, an insurer of the tenants' safety and may be held liable only for actionable negligence in maintaining the premises. *Cagle v. Robert Hall Clothes*, 9 N.C. App. 243, 245 (1970).

5. N.C.G.S. § 42-42(a)(1). Read applicable code provisions only if competent evidence has been admitted as to their existence and content.

6. N.C.G.S. § 42-42(a)(2).

7. N.C.G.S. § 42-42(a)(3). *See Collingwood v. General Electric Real Estate Equities, Inc.*, 89 N.C. App. 656 (1988), *aff'd in part, rev'd in part*, 324 N.C. 63 (1989).

8. N.C.G.S. § 42-42(a)(4).

9. A failure to maintain the premises in a fit and habitable condition is evidence of negligence, not negligence *per se*. *O'Neal v. Kellett*, 55 N.C. App. 225, 228 (1981). Because the Act specifically states that a violation of the Act is not negligence *per se*, the legislature left intact established common-law standards of ordinary and reasonable care. *Brooks v. Francis*, 57 N.C. App. 556, 559-60 (1982); N.C.G.S. § 42-44(d).

Furthermore, the common law negligence instructions apply to a cause of action against a landlord for injuries caused by a tenant's dog; however, the general rule is that no such cause of action will lie as a "landlord has no duty to protect third parties from harm caused by a tenant's animal..." *Curlee v. Johnson*, 377 N.C. 97, 102, 856 S.E.2d 478, 481 (2021) (citing *Stephens v. Covington*, 232 N.C. App. 497, 500, 754 S.E.2d 253, 255 (2014)). An exception to the general rule is found when, "prior to the harm, the landlord (1) 'had knowledge that a tenant's dog posed a danger,' and (2) 'had control over the dangerous dog's presence on the property..." *Id.* If both of these elements are met, the property owner owes a duty of care, so the jury next should determine if the property owner is negligent by breaching that duty.