State v. Miller Confirms that the DWI Motions Statutes are a Hot Mess

No, Justice Ervin didn’t use the words hot mess. But anyone who slogs their way through the tortured procedural swamp that led to State v. Miller, __ N.C. __ (March 18, 2016), is bound to agree that the procedures adopted in 2006 for appeals in DWI cases have created a nearly impenetrable bog for the parties involved. I’m going to do my best here to succinctly explain what happened in Miller. Then I’ll share an idea for freeing litigants and judges from the procedural muck in which they are currently mired.  Facts. The defendant in Miller was pulled over by a Charlotte-Mecklenburg police officer on October 26, 2012, after he avoided a checkpoint. He was charged with driving while impaired and driving after consuming alcohol while under 21. Procedural history (CliffsNotes version). Miller moved in district court to suppress all evidence resulting from the traffic stop. He contended that the officer did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop his car. The district court judge agreed. She filed a preliminary determination granting the motion to suppress.  (District court judges aren’t allowed to just rule on motions to suppress in implied consent cases like they would in any other case. Instead, they must “preliminarily indicate” how they intend to rule and, if the State appeals, wait for instructions from the superior court as to whether to grant or deny the motion.) The State appealed from the district court’s preliminary indication in Miller. One of two things can happen when the State appeals.  [...]